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Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining
with Plea-Based Ceilings
Russell D. Covey*
The ubiquity of plea bargaining creates real concern that innocent defendants are
occasionally, or perhaps even routinely, pleading guilty to avoid coercive trial sentences.
Pleading guilty is a rational choice for defendants as long as prosecutors offerplea discounts so
substantial that trial is not a rational strategy regardless of guilt or innocence. The long-
recognized solution to this problem is to enforce limits on the size of the plea/trial sentencing
differential. As a practical matter, however, discount limits ar unenforceable if prosecutors
retain ultinate discretion over charge selection and declination. Because the doctrine of
prosecutoinal-charging discretion is immune to challenge, conventional fixed discounts are
doomed to failure.
Tis Article urges abandoning the effort to constrain prosecutors' discretion to make
lenient plea offers and instead shilling regulatory focus to the creation of sentencing rules that
prevent trial courts from imposing overly harsh trial sentences. This Article makes an original
contribution to the plea-bargaining literature by demonstrating that effective enforcement of
discount limits is possible through adoption of plea-based ceilings. Ceilings would limit
sentence differentials by ensuring that trial sentences would not exceed plea sentences by more
than a modest amount. Because ceilings focus on limiting punitive trial penalties rather than
preventing overly lenient plea offers, ceilings are practically enforceable in a way that
conventional fixed discounts are not and thus, promise a method to improve the guilt/innocence
sorting function ofcniminalprocedure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining dominates the modem American criminal
process.' Upwards of 95% of all state and federal felony convictions
are obtained by guilty plea.2 The odds of fighting and winning a
criminal case at trial have never been smaller, a fact attested to by the
ever-shrinking number of defendants who successfully contest charges
at trial. In 2004, out of 81,717 defendants whose cases were
terminated in U.S. district courts, only 397 were acquitted after a jury
1. As one set of commentators rather blandly observed, "[tihe practice of
exchanging punishment discounts for waivers of process is widespread." Nancy J. King et al.,
Wen Process Affects Punishment. Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Thal,
and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 962 (2005). Nationwide
data shows that guilty-plea sentences are the least punitive and jury trial sentences the most
punitive. Id at 962-63. Or, as William Stuntz and Dean Scott more colorfully put it: "plea
bargaining is ... not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system." Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contact, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1912 (1992). Without plea bargaining, the number of cases resolved through guilty
pleas almost certainly would plummet, potentially resulting in system-wide gridlock. See
Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Ciminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84
TEX. L. REv. 2023, 2023 (2006) ("[T]he American criminal justice system, like the civil
system, would collapse if even a small percentage of suspects... demanded trials.").
2. See BUR. OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 450 tbl. 5.46 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire
eds., 31st ed. 2005), available at http://albany.edu/sourcebook (reporting state felony
convictions); LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 245 tbl. D-4 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus
2005/appendices/d4.pdf (indicating that 95.7% of all convictions in U.S. district courts were
obtained through guilty pleas).
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trial, the fewest in more than a half-century.3 But not only acquittals
are disappearing. The number of trial convictions in 2004 was also the
lowest in nearly forty years.4
These statistics evidence the astonishing "triumph" of plea
bargaining in American criminal procedure.5 The relentless rise in
guilty plea rates might be less troubling if there were greater
reassurances that defendants who plead guilty are, in fact, guilty.
However, mounting evidence suggests that guilty pleas are not
reserved only for the guilty.6 Nobody knows how many innocent
defendants enter guilty pleas, but the number almost certainly is larger
than has previously been acknowledged.7 Although the causes of false
guilty pleas are undoubtedly numerous, economic analyses of plea
bargaining provide a powerful explanation. Innocent defendants plead
guilty, as do guilty defendants, because the alternative-contesting
guilt at trial-is too risky.8  As one defense lawyer explained in
counseling a client he believed was innocent to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor to avoid trial on serious felony charges, "once a person is
facing felony charges, the issue no longer is whether he did the crime;
it's how to limit the damage."9 The usual way to limit the damage, of
course, is to plea bargain.
3. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online tbl. 5.22.2004 (2004),
http://www.albany.eduisourcebook/pdf/t5222004.pdf.
4. The 2276 persons convicted at trial in U.S. district courts in 2004 was, except for
2002 (when 2271 persons were convicted at trial), the lowest number since 1966. See id
5. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 15-17 (2003) (documenting the ascendancy of plea bargaining since
the mid- 1 800s to present).
6. See Albert W Alschuler, The Prosecutor Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 50, 60-69 (1968) (providing anecdotal evidence that suggests that plea bargaining
induces innocent defendants to plead guilty).
7. The prediction that large plea discounts induce innocent defendants to plead
guilty is more than a product of economic theory. Ample anecdotal evidence demonstrates
that defendants with strong defenses are induced to plead guilty in the face of large plea-
bargained discounts. See id Accumulating evidence in DNA exoneration cases as well as in
major police scandals, such as those that occurred in the Los Angeles RAMPART division
and in Tulia, Texas, demonstrates that innocent people do in fact plead guilty to obtain the
benefits of plea bargains. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonemrions in the United States,
1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 531-36 (2005) (explaining that
thirty-one of thirty-nine falsely accused defendants in the Tulia scandal pleaded guilty, as did
a majority of exonerated defendants whose convictions were overturned based on revelations
of police perjury and misconduct as a result of the Los Angeles RAMPART scandal).
8. See Scott & Stuntz, supr note 1, at 1912 ("Defendants accept bargains because
of the threat of much harsher penalties after trial .... ).
9. STEvE BoGiRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 334 (2005).
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Trials are intolerably risky for most defendants because the
differential between plea sentences and trial sentences is enormous and
growing.'" To stem this trend and to revive the criminal trial as a viable
option for innocent defendants, the sentencing differential must be
addressed.
Numerous commentators have proposed a variety of methods to
reduce the sentence differential. Abolition of plea bargaining,
advocated by some of plea bargaining's most prominent critics, by
definition would erase any plea/trial sentence "differential."" A few
jurisdictions have attempted abolition, at least in part, but those
experiments have produced no lasting successes and certainly have not
inspired widespread emulation.'2 Most observers of the criminal
justice system have come to believe (rightly or wrongly) that abolition
is simply not feasible.'3 In recognition of the unlikelihood of abolition,
10. See id.
11. Although the plea bargaining literature is vast, the most prominent contemporary
critics of plea bargaining are Albert W Alschuler, who has produced an impressive and
comprehensive indictment of plea bargaining in numerous works, and Stephen Schulhofer.
See, e.g., Albert W Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652,
652 (1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, Changing Debate] (urging abolition of plea bargaining);
Albert W Alschuler, The Defense Attomey's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1180 (1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, Defense Attorneys Role] ("[T]he plea bargaining system
is an inherently irrational method ... [,] destructive of sound attorney-client relationships.");
Albert W Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv. 211, 212-21
(1979) [hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining] (challenging the historical justification for
plea bargaining); Alschuler, supm note 6, at 52 ("[P]lea bargaining should be abolished.");
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1037, 1037-38 (1984)
(demonstrating that the abolition of plea bargaining is a real possibility); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992) [hereinafter
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disasteti ("[P]lea bargaining seriously impairs the public
interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of the guilty from the
innocent.").
12. Prominent attempts to abolish plea bargaining in whole or in part were pursued in
Alaska in the mid-1970s and in El Paso, Texas (as to burglary) in the 1980s. See Teresa
White Cams & John Kruse, A Re-Evaluation ofAlaskas Plea Bargaining Ban, 8 ALASKA L.
REv. 27, 33-34 (1991) (discussing the effects of the ban in Alaska); Robert A. Weninger, The
Abolition of Plea Bargaining A Case Study of El Paso Coun(y, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV
265, 275-78 (1987) (discussing the ban from 1978-84 in El Paso, Texas); see also State v.
Hessen, 678 A.2d 1082, 1085-86 (N.J. 1996) (discussing New Jersey's ban on plea bargaining
in municipal court from 1974 through 1990 and its continuing ban on plea bargaining in
drunk driving cases).
13. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Baigaining of
International Cimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV 1, 19-20 (2002) ("[E]ven the harshest critics of plea
bargaining have limited their abolition proposals to cases involving the more serious crimes
and have acknowledged that reducing or eliminating plea bargaining will require the
expenditure of additional resources and the simplification of procedures."). John Langbein
has provided a spirited argument that plea bargaining can be reduced or eliminated by
simplifying trial procedure and points to Germany as a model. See John H. Langbein, Land
Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 204-05 (1979).
1240
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others have advocated a less radical approach to plea-bargaining
reform involving so-called "fixed discounts."' Fixed discounts
regularize the guilty-plea process by establishing a fixed and
nonnegotiable discount for pleading guilty.'5 In a fixed-discount
system, defendants who plead guilty receive a set reduction in sentence
in exchange for their guilty plea." To be effective, the fixed discount
must be large enough to provide an incentive for guilty defendants to
plead guilty, but it must not be so large that it induces all defendants,
guilty and innocent alike, to relinquish their trial rights."
Fixed discounts only work, however, if they are really fixed.
Unfortunately, the Achilles' heel of virtually all fixed-discount
proposals offered to date is their utter failure to confront realistically
the problem of enforcement. Most fixed-discount proposals assume
that courts will police plea bargaining by rejecting guilty pleas
whenever the terms of the plea are "overly lenient."'8 But this is a job
judges are poorly suited to perform. Any system of fixed discounts
that depends on preventing prosecutors from making and defendants
from accepting overly lenient plea offers is doomed. Prosecutorial
discretion over charging decisions, including the important discretion
not to charge at all, is far too deeply embedded to be abolished, or even
substantially limited.
This Article argues that fixed discounts offer the most promising
practical solution to the plea-bargaining epidemic and that an effective
fixed-discount system can be devised, but only if the traditional fixed-
discount paradigm is radically shifted.'9 Rather than try to constrain
the discretion of prosecutors to make lenient plea offers (or of
Various jurisdictions' bans on one type of bargaining, such as bans on sentence bargaining,
are examples of this simplification.
14. See, e.g., Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really "'Ban" Plea
Bargaining" The Core Concerns ofPlea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 782 (1998)
("The establishment of a set of written sentencing discounts ... limits the concessions the




18. See, e.g., Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2295, 2335 (2006) ("The partial ban system relies on courts to review the bargained-for
sentences, requiring them to reject exceedingly lenient bargains.").
19. Relevant statutory provisions in England and Wales, however, might do
something similar: add a one-third "trial tariff" to plea offers where defendants are convicted
at trial. See Candace McCoy, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Hammer: The Trial Penalty in
the USA, in THE JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23, 26-27 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003)




defendants to accept and judges to approve them), ° which is a fool's
errand, this Article argues that the better strategy is to attack the other
pole of the differential. Accordingly, it proposes a way to eliminate the
punitive trial sentences that coerce defendants to accept the plea-
bargained alternative through adoption of a device referred to herein as
"plea-based ceilings."
As the name suggests, plea-based ceilings would establish
mandatory caps or ceilings on trial sentences. Pursuant to the ceiling,
no defendant could receive a punishment after trial that exceeded the
sentence he could have had as a result of a plea offer by more than a
modest, predetermined amount. Ceilings would thus limit the
sentencing differential and enforce a fixed discount by capping the
punishment that could be imposed on the defendant who pleads not
guilty.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part H sets forth the long-
recognized benefits that adoption of fixed plea discounts would bring
to the plea-bargaining process. These benefits include: increased
incentives for innocent defendants to contest their cases and for
prosecutors to screen out weak cases from their dockets, diminished
incentives to overcharge, and the elimination of bartering from the
criminal justice process without the concomitant elimination of guilty
pleas.
Notwithstanding these widely recognized benefits, fixed
discounts have never been successfully implemented in the United
States.' Part III discusses why conventional fixed-discount proposals
have not succeeded to date and why, as conventionally envisioned, they
will not work. Part 1H examines in particular why the fixed-discount
provisions embedded in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have failed
to have the beneficent effects lauded by fixed-discount advocates. Part
IV then introduces the concept of plea-based ceilings and
demonstrates how ceilings solve the problems of evasion and judicial
oversight that plague conventional fixed-discount reforms. 2  Part IV
seeks to demonstrate that the structure of plea-based ceilings makes
them especially difficult to circumvent, thereby substantially
20. That is, to place new external constraints apart from those that currently operate,
i.e., the facts of the case and the range of penalties permitted by the penal code.
21. See infia notes 26-88 and accompanying text. Fixed-plea discounts have been
implemented, albeit with limited success, in Italy. See Nicola Boari & Gianluca Fiorentini,
An Economic Analysis of Plea Bargaining The Incentives of the Parties in a Mixed Penal
System, 21 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 213, 217 (2001) (noting that only a very small percentage
of cases are resolved in Italy through plea bargains).
22. See infia notes 89-147 and accompanying text.
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enhancing their effectiveness to mitigate the worst features of the plea-
bargaining system.
Part V expands on the discussion of the benefits that adoption of
a plea-based ceiling system would bring. Part V demonstrates how
plea-based ceilings would obviate the worst abuses of the present plea-
bargaining system, including the use of the death penalty to induce
guilty pleas and other coercive bargaining tactics. Finally, Part VI
considers potential objections, including concerns that ceilings might
unduly constrict judicial sentencing discretion, and addresses questions
that might arise from the United States Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Blakely v Washington23 and United States v Booker 4 that
implicate judicial sentencing discretion. It also briefly considers the
problems that might be injected by the need to preserve inducements
to cooperate." Part VI finally touches on the most intangible and
practical question: is this, or any plea-bargaining reform, possible?
The Article suggests that reform is possible if, but only if, the political
will to reform can be mustered.
II. How FIXED DISCOUNTS AMELIORATE PLEA BARGAINING'S FLAWS
Most commentators that have advocated reform of plea
bargaining have begun by criticizing the dramatic gap between plea
and trial sentences. 6 This differential, alternatively referred to as the
"plea discount" or "trial penalty"'27 depending on the perspective, is
23. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
24. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
25. See infra notes 192-208 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 11, at 660 ("[N]either a guilty-
plea defendant's possibly repentant state of mind nor the economic benefit that he may confer
upon the state can justify the imposition of a less severe sentence than the one that he would
have received had he exercised the right to trial.") Alschuler cites a study conducted by Hans
Zeisel finding that "sentences of New York City defendants convicted at trial were 136%
more severe than those proposed by prosecutors in pretrial offers to the same defendants." Id.
at 653. He further describes the sentencing differential as shockingly large. Id. at 656.
Another commentator characterizes plea bargaining as an essentially unilateral process by
which the prosecutor coerces defendants to plead guilty, illustrating with a case in which the
defendant rejected a plea offer carrying a prison term of two to six years and received, after
conviction at trial, a term of forty to eighty years. See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful
Reform ofPlea Bargaining: The Control ofProsecutoialDiscretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 37,
39 (citing People v. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)).
27. Plea discounts and trial penalties are simply two sides of the same coin, a logical
conclusion many courts have reluctantly reached. SeeRoberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552,
557 n.4 (1980) ("We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between 'enhancing'
the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the 'leniency' he claims would
be appropriate if he had cooperated."); Coles v. United States, 682 A.2d 167, 169 (D.C. 1996)
("The line between affording leniency to a defendant who has admitted guilt by pleading
2008] 1243
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indisputably the engine that drives the plea-bargaining machine.8
Numerous commentators have argued that plea bargaining's worst
effects could be eliminated by limiting or "fixing" the size of the plea
discount.29
In such a fixed-discount system, defendants who plead guilty
would receive a standard, predetermined discount off the sentence they
guilty and punishing one who has denied his guilt and proceeded to trial is elusive, to say the
least."). Nonetheless, courts have held that imposition of a trial penalty is improper even
while permitting plea discounts. See, e.g., United States v. Hutchings, 757 E2d 11, 14 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("The '[a]ugmentation of sentence' based on a defendant's decision to 'stand on
[his] right to put the Government to its proof rather than plead guilty' is clearly improper."
(quoting United States v. Araujo, 539 E2d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1976))). In this Article, I refer to
both plea discounts and trial penalties and mean by both phrases the difference between the
plea and trial sentence. However, I calculate plea discounts from an ex ante position, and the
trial penalty from an ex post position. As a result, the same sentence differential can be
described mathematically in two different ways. Where the plea sentence is two years and the
trial sentence three years, the defendant who pleads guilty receives a "plea discount" of 33%
(because the sentence he receives is only two-thirds of the sentence he otherwise would have
received), while the defendant who goes to trial and loses is subject to a trial penalty of 50%
(because the sentence he receives is half again as bad as the sentence he could have had).
28. See Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 11, at 652 ("Criminal defendants
today plead guilty in overwhelming numbers primarily because they perceive that this action
is likely to lead to more lenient treatment than would follow conviction at trial."); Loftus E.
Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 757, 839 (1988)
("If plea bargaining is to exist at all, there must be some differential...."). Becker further
notes:
Unless it is to be based on wholly illusory benefits, a functioning system of
plea bargaining must provide defendants with an incentive to plead guilty.
Therefore, defendants who insist on trial must suffer in some way if they are
convicted. It is ordinarily assumed that this suffering will be in the form of harsher
sentences, and in all probability this is often true.
Becker, supra, at 764 n.18.
29. See CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 284 (1978)
(arguing that a "more effective solution would be to try to hold the 'price' of going to trial to a
reasonable level" by limiting the difference in sentences after pleas and trial); Rudolf J.
Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARiz. L. REv. 135, 146-47 (2001) (arguing that
deleterious effects of plea bargaining could be moderated by either "provid[ing] a preset
discount for defendants who plead guilty" or with legislation that "prohibit[s] prosecutors
from reducing a charge or a sentence more than one level or class below its original
designation"); John Kaplan, Ameican Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the
Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 AM. J. CIM. L. 215, 222 (1977) (favoring a flat 50%
reduction of sentences for defendants who plead guilty); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process
of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 779-80 (1980) (arguing that guilty plea concessions
should be limited to relatively small discounts to ensure fair results); James Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1560-61 (1981) ("If...
most cases in which a plea bargain is made involve defendants whose conviction is virtually
certain, a relatively modest, prescribed sentencing concession of ten or twenty percent of the
sentence received for a guilty plea should induce the pleas needed to keep the docket
manageable.").
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would have received had they been convicted after a trial."
Alternatively, the size of the plea discount might be capped rather than
fixed, as Oren Gazal-Ayal has recently proposed.' Both fixed
discounts and Gazal-Ayal's caps are based on similar logic: a
limitation on prosecutors' discretion to offer overly large guilty-plea
discounts can shape the strategic decisions of both defendants and
prosecutors in ways that ultimately improve the plea-bargaining
process and reduce the risk that innocent defendants will be induced to
falsely plead guilty.
Fixed-plea discounts offer four primary benefits, which will be
discussed in detail below. First, where large discounts are routinely
offered, all defendants have strong incentives to plead guilty, including
defendants in weak cases (presumably including a disproportionately
large number of innocent defendants)." Fixed discounts prevent
prosecutors from offering discounts so large that innocent defendants
are essentially coerced to plead guilty to avoid the risk of a
dramatically harsher sentence. Second, because fixed discounts limit
prosecutors' ability to dispose of weak cases through plea bargaining
by changing the defendant's incentive structure, fixed discounts
directly impact prosecutorial screening practices, creating strong
incentives to dismiss weak cases rather than try them. Third, fixed
discounts reduce prosecutorial incentives to overcharge criminal
defendants by eliminating the bargaining leverage that can be obtained
through strategic overcharging." Absent those incentives, a prosecutor
is more likely to select charges based on the prosecutor's actual
evaluation of the defendant's culpability. Fourth, precisely because the
discounts are fixed and available to every defendant who decides to
plead guilty rather than contest guilt at trial, fixed discounts put an end
to "barter justice," an aspect of the criminal process that is highly
corrosive to the system's legitimacy in the eyes of the public,
30. Suggested discounts range from 10-50% or higher. See, e.g., Kaplan, supa note
29, at 222 (urging a discount of 50%); Vorenberg, supm note 29, at 1560-61 (urging a fixed
discount of 10-20%). The Guidelines incorporate an approximately 25-35% fixed discount
for "acceptance of responsibility" universally understood to serve as code language for
pleading guilty. See Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49
J.L. & ECON. 353, 355 (2006).
31. See Gazal-Ayal, supa note 18, at 2313-22 (arguing for a partial ban on plea
bargaining whereby a prosecutor would not be able to offer a plea above a certain percentage
of the posttrial sentence).
32. See hfa notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
33. See Mfa notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
34. See infma notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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professionals who work in the criminal courts, and, perhaps most
importantly, criminal defendants themselves.35
A. Tial Selection Effects
Economists and lawyers applying economic analysis to plea
bargaining provide a robust explanation for the high guilty-plea rate by
focusing on plea bargaining's pricing mechanism.36 According to this
analysis, plea prices are the function of three inputs: the probability of
conviction (POC), the anticipated sentence upon conviction at trial
(ATS), and the resources saved by avoiding trial (R), where plea price
(P) = (POC)(ATS)R.37 Both as a matter of formal theory and informal
practice, the size of the discount necessary to induce a defendant to
waive his right to trial is the "price" of the plea.38 The rational calculus
that induces most defendants to plead guilty flows directly from the
formula that sets plea-bargain prices. Assuming that a defendant's
primary goal is to minimize punishment, and setting aside the effects
of cognitive biases like loss aversion, discounting, and risk-preference,
rational defendants should prefer a guilty plea whenever the plea price
falls below the expected sentence after trial (ETS).39
As the pricing formula shows, plea prices will be higher where
the evidence is weaker. For example, where the ATS upon conviction
is ten years and the POC is 50%, a rational defendant whose sole goal
is to minimize punishment should be preference-neutral between a
35. See htzfa notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
36. See Jennifer E Reinganum, Plea Bargaining andProsecutoiial Discretion, 78 AM.
ECON. RE. 713, 714 (1988)
37. Frank H. Easterbrook, Crim'nal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 308-09 (1983) (noting that plea prices are set based on prosecutor's punishment-
maximizing strategy, which includes sharing the resource gains obtained by foregoing trial);
Reinganum, supra note 36, at 714 (describing expected trial sentence (ETS) as "the product
of the probability of conviction and the anticipated sentence upon conviction at trial"-
discounted by resource savings (R)); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1941-42 (explaining that
plea prices reflect estimated posttrial sentence, probability of conviction, and adjudication
costs).
38. Big discounts represent high prices, and small discounts represent low prices.
39. Of course, sentence is merely one aspect of the defendant's total punishment
"cost'" The stigmatic and collateral consequences that accompany a conviction might far
exceed the costs imposed by the sentence. Such additional costs are least important with
respect to repeat offenders who have already absorbed the brunt of those costs as a result of
earlier convictions. Although a more sophisticated economic analysis would factor in those
costs, the basic incentive structure remains the same. Taking stigmatic and collateral
consequences of convictions into account suggests that even greater discounts are necessary
to induce defendants to plead guilty. For a more complete discussion of the impact of
cognitive bias on plea bargaining, see Russell D. Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship
Between Cognitive Psychology andPlea Bargaining, 91 MARQUETTE L. REv. 213 (2007).
[Vol. 82:12371246
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plea-bargained sentence of five years and a trial. ° Where the POC
falls to only 20%, the preference-neutral plea price falls to two years.
Because guilty pleas consume substantially fewer resources than trials,
plea prices must also factor in resource savings. Although defendants
and prosecutors alike share an interest in minimizing process costs,
4
'
the lion's share of process costs are borne by the state, and, as a result,
prosecutors typically gain more than defendants by avoiding trial.
Guilty pleas must thus be twice discounted: once to reflect the
possibility of acquittal and once more to reflect the premium the
prosecutor is willing to pay to avoid incurring the resource costs of
trial.43  For a defendant that begins with a ten-year ATS and a 50%
POC, the plea-pricing mechanism should produce a plea offer carrying
a penalty somewhere between zero and five years.
Both parties are by definition better off plea bargaining than
going to trial. The defendant's expected sentence after plea (EPS) is
necessarily lower than his ETS, and the prosecutor obtains more value
(that is, a higher ES/R) through bargaining than through trial. As a
result, the plea-pricing model predicts that rational actors will always
prefer to resolve their cases through guilty pleas rather than trials."
40. Risk preference can impact the attractiveness of economically equivalent offers.
See Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Baigaining and Social Welfare, 73 Am.
ECON. REv. 749, 755 (1983) (showing that differences in risk preference reduce the separating
effect of guilty and innocent defendants through plea bargaining and, thus, reduce the utility
of plea bargaining as a screening device).
41. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIINAL COURT 199-240 (1979).
42. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1941 ("[A]djudication costs are
disproportionately visited on prosecutors....").
43. Obviously, the prosecutor's sensitivity to resource costs is a critical determinant of
the plea discount, because prosecutors who affirmatively desire trials will be unwilling to
provide any process discount at all.
44. See Scott & Stuntz, supm note 1, at 1935-40. Some commentators point to this
prediction as a flaw, because, in fact, not every case is resolved by plea bargaining. See, e.g.,
Chantale LaCasse & A. Abigail Payne, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory
Minmum Sentences.- Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?, 42 J.L. & ECON.
245, 249 (1999) (describing models based on minimizing expected sentences as not making
useful predictions about the probability that a case is resolved by plea, because the model
predicts that all cases are resolved by plea). This is not a valid criticism of the model,
however. First, given plea rates exceeding 95%, the model's prediction comes quite close to
actual practice. Second, the model helpfully supports the further prediction that cases that do
not result in plea bargains are those in which the presuppositions of the theory are not
satisfied, as in the case where one party is not acting rationally, where there is no agreement
regarding the worth of the case or the punishment that will be imposed, or where external
considerations intrude upon the calculations of the parties. For a compelling argument that
such factors are in fact at work, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2463, 2469 (2004).
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It is worth emphasizing that as long as plea discounts are
proportioned to the POC, contrary to the conventional wisdom that
trials are reserved for hard cases, there is no reason to believe that the
cases that do go to trial are those in which the evidence is weakest or
innocence most likely.4  In an unfettered market, prosecutors can
simply increase the discount in weak cases to the point where a
rational defendant will accept the offer, 6 inducing defendants to enter
guilty pleas even where the odds of acquittal are great because the
consequences of a trial conviction are, although remote, intolerable.47
In fact, as long as the strength of the evidence determines the price for
guilty pleas, the only cases that rational defendants would take to trial
are those in which (1) the parties have a significant"8 disagreement
about the "worth of the case" (i.e., the ETS),"9 (2) at least one party is
45. Innocent defendants do not receive better plea offers than guilty defendants
because prosecutors have no way to distinguish the two classes. Prosecutors therefore base
their plea offers primarily on the data to which they do have access, i.e., the strength of the
case. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1948 ("The structural dynamic of plea bargaining
leads ... to a single variable contract in which all defendants--whether guilty or innocent-
are offered a sentence based upon the prosecutor's estimate of the strength of the case at the
time of bargaining plus the expected savings in transaction costs....").
46. See Alschuler, supm note 6, at 60 ("The universal rule is that the sentence
differential between guilty-plea and trial defendants increases in direct proportion to the
likelihood of acquittal."). To address this concern, many commentators have argued that
limitations on the inducements available to prosecutors should be imposed. See, e.g., Albert
W Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power. A Citique of Recent Proposals
for "Fired" and 'Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 575 (1978) (arguing for
small, set discounts); Becker, supra note 28, at 837 (pointing to two instances especially rife
with the potential to extract guilty pleas from innocent defendants: (1) plea bargains induced
by the threat of death penalty and (2) plea bargains induced by the promise of immediate
release upon a plea of guilty, with the threat of continued pretrial incarceration if the plea is
refused); King et al., supra note 1, at 991-92 (arguing for small fixed discounts but
acknowledging practical obstacles posed by coven discounts and charge concessions).
47. The dynamic is illustrated by a now-familiar anecdote originally provided by a
San Francisco defense attorney who had represented a defendant charged with rape. See
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 61. The attorney was convinced that the man was innocent and
would be acquitted at trial. Id. When the prosecutor offered the defendant a chance to plead
guilty to simple battery, however, the defendant quickly took the deal notwithstanding his
counsel's evaluation of the case, saying simply, "'I can't take the chance."' Id
48. The disagreement must be significant in most cases because plea discounts
usually exceed the discounted trial sentence by a substantial margin. Hence, small
disagreements between the parties about the ETS should not prevent them from viewing any
particular plea offer favorably.
49. ETS =POC *ATS. The parties' disagreement about the ETS might be a result of
a disagreement about the strength of the evidence in the case or the likely sentence that will
be imposed by the judge in the event of conviction.
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not acting rationally,"° or (3) at least one party affirmatively desires a
trial for non-punishment-maximizing/minimizing reasons.
None of these circumstances provides much reason to believe that
innocent defendants are more likely than guilty ones to demand trials.'
Although the only types of disagreements that will result in rejection
of a plea bargain are those in which the government estimates the
value of a case as worth more (carrying a higher ETS) than the
defendant, that disagreement can take place at any point on the
spectrum. Disagreements about case worth are just as likely to occur
at the very top (death sentence versus life sentence, or 95% POC
versus 75% POC), as they are at the bottom (short prison term versus
probation, 30% POC versus 10% POC). It is not clear why
disagreements at the low end of the spectrum would occur with any
less frequency than at the high end, or that innocent defendants are any
more likely to act irrationally in refusing a punishment-minimizing
offer than guilty defendants. Indeed, for the same reasons that guilty
persons are expected as a class to have higher discount rates and
greater tolerances for risk-taking, guilty parties might be more likely
than their innocent counterparts to reject irrationally what are
objectively reasonable plea offers, further skewing the mix of cases
selected for trial in the direction of guilty defendants.52 After all, the
very decision to engage in criminal conduct might be said to reflect a
deviation from what constitutes rational conduct.
True, some innocent defendants probably categorically refuse to
plead guilty regardless of how good a deal is offered them. While
those cases marginally increase the number of innocent people who
insist on trial, prosecutors assuredly refuse sometimes to make
reasonable plea offers where the evidence of guilt is strong, because
they believe that such defendants' cases are best resolved by trial for
policy reasons (e.g., public interest in airing of facts, commitment to
resolution of certain types of cases or issues by juries), they want the
practice, or simply because they wish to maintain a high "batting
50. By "not acting rationally" I mean not pursuing a course reasonably designed to
minimize punishment, in the case of defendants, or to maximize the punishment/resources
ratio, in the case of prosecutors. For an economic analysis of the prosecutor's incentives in
these terms, see Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 290-98, 309-17.
51. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supm note 11, at 2004 (noting that
the plea-bargaining system selects cases for trial based not on likelihood of acquittal, but on
degree of risk aversion of defendant, and noting that a fixed-discount system would change
the predicted case selection).
52. See Bibas, supm note 44, at 2469 (describing various psychological barriers to
rational plea-bargaining decision making by defendants); Covey, supa note 39, 218-23, 225-
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average."" Because there is no reason to believe that innocent
defendants demand trials in weak cases more frequently than
prosecutors demand trials of guilty defendants in strong cases, there is
no reason to believe that, in the absence of restraints on bargaining, the
mix of cases that go to trial will be weighted more heavily to innocent
defendants than guilty defendants."
Fixed discounts address this problem by discouraging pleas in all
cases in which the expected trial sentence falls below the fixed
discount." By preventing prosecutors from making offers sufficiently
lenient to entice defendants in weak cases to plead guilty, fixed
discounts create varying incentives to plead guilty depending on the
strength of the evidence of guilt. As a result, implementation of a
system of fixed-plea discounts should change the mix of defendants
who take their cases to trial by encouraging persons most likely to be
acquitted to forgo guilty pleas (because the available plea sentence
would be higher than the ETS), while encouraging those with high
POCs, that is, those most likely to be convicted at trial, to plead
guilty.6 Because weak cases are likely to include a disproportionate
number of innocent defendants, fixed discounts should encourage a
larger proportion of innocent defendants to refuse to plead guilty and
53. See Daniel S. Medved, The Zeal Deal Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 137 (2004) (reporting practice in
prosecutors' offices of publicly tracking prosecutor's win-loss records or maintaining "batting
averages").
54. See Albert W Alschuler, The Trial Judge Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76
COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1126 (1976) (observing that because prosecutors provide larger
"breaks" in weaker cases, "cases involving substantial legal and factual disputes seem every
bit as likely to be compromised as cases that present no genuine issues").
55. See id. at 1127 (noting that defendants "whose prospects of acquittal were
substantial" would be more likely to demand trial where plea discount is fixed). Gazal-Ayal's
partial ban proposal operates on the same principle. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 18, at 2301
n.12. The advantage the partial ban has over a fixed discount, however, is that it preserves
flexibility in tailoring the size of the plea discount to the specifics of cases, ensuring that 98%
POC cases are not given the same discount as 70% POC cases. See id.
56. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargning as Disaster, supra note 11, at 2004-05 (advoca-
ting abolition of bargaining while retaining fixed discounts, but noting that such a reform
would be "imperfect" unless attorneys' financial incentives were changed so that they did not
have structural preference for settlement through plea bargaining). One could argue that this
would be a mixed bag for such defendants. On the one hand, some innocent defendants who
would have pleaded guilty would win acquittals. On the other hand, some innocent
defendants who would have received a lenient deal would now be convicted and likely subject
to a much harsher posttrial sentence. Those who advocate abolition of large plea discounts
contend that such an outcome is more consistent with society's interests in ensuring that
convictions "reflect guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 2000. Schulhofer further notes
that abolition of plea bargaining need not mean abolition of guilty pleas, only abolition of
large plea discounts that induce guilty pleas. Id. at 2001 n.75.
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to hold out for trial, where they will be acquitted in proportionately
larger numbers.
B. Screening Effects
Although the change in the mix of cases that go to trial is
significant, arguably the most important benefit of fixed discounts is
its predicted impact on prosecutorial screening practices.57 Recent
scholarship has highlighted the critical linkage between plea
bargaining and prosecutorial screening. 8 As Ronald Wright and Marc
Miller persuasively demonstrate, where prosecutors devote more
resources to screening out weak cases, the pressure to plea bargain
correspondingly diminishes. Where prosecutors fail to invest
resources in early, accurate screening, prosecutors tend to rely on
negotiation as the primary mechanism to resolve charges, thereby
causing many of the negative effects noted by critics of plea
bargaining.' Prosecutors can reduce their reliance on negotiated guilty
pleas by adopting "hard screening" practices to ensure that solid
evidence, likely to hold up at trial, supports the filed charges.' Hard
screening requires prosecutors to conduct careful, early evaluations of
witnesses and other evidence, legal arguments and defenses available
to defendants, and likely jury responses to cases, which permit
prosecutors to make confident assessments of trial outcomes." Where
prosecutors pursue cases in which the POC is high, defendants have
little ability to negotiate large plea discounts because prosecutors are
confident of obtaining a trial conviction. As a result, prosecutors who
engage in hard screening will find it easier to limit plea bargaining,
and defendants in those jurisdictions will be more likely to enter "open
pleas"--that is, pleas of guilty as charged. Open pleas resemble fixed-
discount pleas in that they are made in order to obtain much smaller
and more predictable discounts from judges rather than large variable
discounts from prosecutors.63
57. SeeBar-Gill & GazalAyal, supm note 30, at 354.
58. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tmdeofl, 55 STAN.
L. RE. 29,48-51 (2002).
59. See id. at 67-74.
60. Id. at 33. Reliance on negotiated pleas undermines public confidence in the
criminal justice system and puts pressure on innocent defendants to plead guilty to lesser
charges to avoid the risk of conviction at trial.
61. Id. at 32-33.
62. Id. at 57-58.
63. Id. at 73-74 (presenting evidence showing that "open plea" rate is much higher in
New Orleans, where hard-screening practices coupled with restrictions on plea bargaining
have been implemented, than in other jurisdictions).
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Wright and Miller make a compelling case that adoption of hard-
screening policies leads to fewer plea bargains and that the reduction in
the number of plea bargains in weak cases will benefit innocent
defendants.' In addition, as Wright and Miller have cogently argued,
screening weak cases early in the process produces dividends later on:
prosecutors can increase the conviction rate, decrease pressure to
provide bargaining inducements or to look for ways to evade guideline
sentences, decrease the disparity among defendants convicted of the
same crimes, and enhance public perceptions of fairness in the
criminal justice system.6
Although these benefits can be obtained, as Wright and Miller
advocate, by tightening screening processes rather than constraining
plea-bargaining discretion, the arrow points in both directions.66 If a
constraint on the ability of prosecutors to dispose of their weak cases
through plea bargaining were in place, prosecutors' incentives to
devote more resources to screening would correspondingly increase.
As scholars advocating fixed discounts have explained, when plea
discounts are limited, prosecutors lose the ability to obtain cheap guilty
pleas in weak cases." To obtain convictions in such cases, prosecutors
must go to trial. But rather than take a larger number of weak cases to
trial, prosecutors would likely respond by screening out more of their
weak cases. Assuming that probability of guilt and probability of
conviction are positively correlated, the result would be a decrease in
the number of innocent persons convicted." Even a malicious
prosecutor who did not consciously intend to reduce the number of
weak cases filed would find her ability to pursue weak cases limited
because the increase in resources required to prosecute those weak
cases would necessarily reduce the total number of cases she could
pursue.
Prosecutors, in other words, face a double incentive against
pursuing weak cases where discounts are fixed. Not only must they
expect to have to try more of them, but also they must expect to lose
more of them precisely because the cases are weak. Given these
changed incentives, we can readily predict at least two changes in
prosecutorial conduct as a result of fixed discounts: prosecutors will
64. See id at 94-95.
65. See id at 84-103.
66. Id.
67. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 18, at 2324-27.
68. See id. at 2295; see also Bar-Gill & Gazal Ayal, supra note 30, at 354 (proposing
that prosecutors barred from offering sufficiently lenient plea bargains will be induced to
substitute weaker cases with stronger cases rather than take the weak cases to trial).
[Vol. 82:12371252
PLEA -BASED CEIL7NGS
screen out more weak cases from their files and will turn more weak
cases into strong cases.69 The latter can be accomplished, for example,
by increasing the amount of investigatory resources devoted to weak
cases. Although prosecutors might prefer to take a lenient plea to an
underinvestigated case rather than to devote additional resources to the
case, demanding that convictions be backed by strong evidence of guilt
better serves the public interest in ensuring accurate convictions."
Encouraging more conservative charging practices can also strengthen
weak cases. If prosecutors replace hard-to-prove high charges with
easier-to-prove but less serious charges, the higher probability of
conviction will make guilty pleas easier to obtain.
In short, imposing limits on plea bargaining through fixed
discounts would necessitate reforms in prosecutorial screening just as
much as tightened screening would lessen pressure to plea bargain.
This is a significant insight. After all, there is no reason to believe that
prosecutors have any particular interest in adopting hard-screening
policies without some external inducement. Fixed-plea discounts
would provide the required inducement by making it difficult to
dispose of weak cases later.' The more effective the fixed-discount
system is-that is, the more difficult it is to negotiate a plea bargain
that exceeds the maximum discount permitted-the stronger
prosecutors' incentives are to screen out weak cases early rather than
suffer the embarrassment of dismissing cases after charges have been
filed or, worse yet, losing at trial.72 In sum, fixed discounts would
compel prosecutors to diminish the number of weak cases they pursue
by screening cases more carefully early in the investigative process,
69. Empirical studies demonstrate that strength of evidence in the case plays a strong
role in prosecutorial charging decisions. See, e.g., LYNN M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR
TRIAL?: THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL-CASE DISPOSITION 41-44 (1979) (classifying strength of
cases into three categories); FRANK W MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A
SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 21-23 (1969) (pointing to data that suggests "the use of a somewhat
lower level of proof when the likelihood of a plea of guilty is greater than usual"); Celesta A.
Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 291,
293 (1987) (citing numerous studies showing that prosecutors' charging decisions are
affected by the strength of evidence).
70. SeeWright & Miller, supra note 58, at 96-98.
71. Capping discounts, rather than fixing them, has the added advantage of
preserving an unfettered plea-bargaining market in the strongest cases while preventing plea
bargaining in the weakest cases.
72. This may not only reduce the number of cases on the prosecutors' dockets but
also may induce prosecutors to change the overall mix of cases they pursue, by substituting
strong cases for weak ones. Given the already high declination rate, there is no reason to
assume that prosecutors already select the highest POC cases to pursue from among the
broad spectrum. If prosecutors do not do so, then the adoption of fixed discounts need not
diminish the total number of convictions.
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making more conservative charging decisions, and investing more
resources into the investigation of those cases to ensure that they do
not get stuck with unpleadable and untriable cases later.
C Overcharging
Fixed discounts also reduce the efficacy, and thus the frequency,
of prosecutorial overcharging. Where there are no limits on the size of
plea discounts, as is typically the case, prosecutors can be expected to,
and do routinely, overcharge simply because overcharging gives
prosecutors bargaining leverage.73  In most cases, prosecutors
overcharge not because they seek to impose unduly harsh sentences on
defendants, but simply because of the bargaining leverage it provides. '
Prosecutors can overcharge cases in at least two ways.75 First,
horizontal overcharging occurs when prosecutors pad charges with
nonoverlapping counts of a similar offense type, or with multiple
counts of the same offense type, where the underlying criminal
conduct sought to be punished is adequately penalized by a single
count.76 The leverage gained by horizontal overcharging is especially
powerful when the added counts carry mandatory minimum sentences
that must be imposed consecutively. Second, vertical overcharging
occurs when prosecutors charge a higher offense than the evidence
reasonably supports.7  When prosecutors engage in vertical
73. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blacknun, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that "prosecutors, without saying so, may sometimes bring charges
more serious than they think appropriate for the ultimate disposition of a case, in order to gain
bargaining leverage," but that such practices have never been "openly sanctioned" by the
Supreme Court); Alschuler, supm note 6, at 90 (quoting a prosecutor admitting that
overcharging is a "lever"); Gifford, supa note 26, at 43 ("Where there is doubt as to whether
the defendant can be convicted on the original charge, it is often because the prosecutor has
'overcharged' to gain additional leverage to induce the defendant to plead to the 'real
offense."').
74. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 217 (noting that prosecutors have strong interest in
lobbying legislatures for harsher sentences, not because they wish to impose such sentences
on defendants, but so that they can use them as a "club to coerce more guilty pleas").
75. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 85-87 (discussing vertical and horizontal
overcharging).
76. George Fisher's account of the rise of plea bargaining in Middlesex County,
Massachusetts links its origins to liquor cases making the practice of horizontal overcharging
possible. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 22-24. Plea bargaining was possible in these cases,
Fisher explains, because prosecutors could charge multiple counts of liquor offenses, each of
which carried a fixed fine of between two and six pounds upon conviction, and judges had
little authority to alter the punishment. Id. Fisher found that deals in which multiple liquor
counts were dropped in exchange for pleas to one or more remaining counts were among the
earliest recorded examples of plea bargaining. Id
77. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 86; Gifford, supra note 26, at 47-48.
1254
PLEA -BASED CEILINGS
overcharging, they pressure defendants to plead guilty to a lesser
offense-often to the charge that absent strategic considerations would
have been selected initially-simply to avoid risking conviction on the
higher charge. 8  Both types of overcharging make it easier for
prosecutors to induce defendants to plead guilty by increasing
defendants' sentencing exposure at trial.
Fixed discounts discourage prosecutors from engaging in both
types of strategic overcharging. Fixed discounts discourage vertical
overcharging (assuming, of course, that fixed discounts cannot be
circumvented through charge bargaining), by negating the leverage
that accompanies pursuit of charges that are hard to prove but, in the
event of conviction, carry extremely severe punishment.79 Because the
highest charge carries a low POC, when the plea discount is fixed, the
prosecutor cannot offer a large enough discount to make a guilty plea
to that charge attractive. She also has little incentive to pursue the
charge at trial given its low likelihood of success. As a result, in a
fixed-discount regime that bars charge bargaining, prosecutors can be
expected to refrain from charging defendants with offenses they are
unlikely to be able to prove at trial.
Fixed discounts render horizontal overcharging similarly
unattractive for a different reason. Although the evidence might well
permit convictions on redundant counts and increase the sentence a
defendant receives upon conviction, as long as the prosecutor cannot
bargain away the added counts, they do not increase bargaining
leverage. Because the plea discount is fixed, the additional counts
merely increase the plea sentence by the same proportion that they
increase the trial sentence.0 Therefore, the prosecutor obtains no
78. SeeAlschuler, supra note 6, at 86; Gifford, supra note 26, at 48.
79. Absent fixed or capped discounts, the addition of weak but more serious charges
always results in an incremental increase of bargaining leverage, because the POC on those
charges is always positive (POC> 0). Thus, the added ETS is also greater than zero, which
at least marginally increases exposure and makes any particular plea offer proportionately
more attractive.
80. For example, imagine a defendant charged with one count of an offense, carrying
a mandatory five-year sentence and a POC of 50%. If the prosecutor charges a second count
and the POC is unchanged by the addition of the second count, the defendant's ETS increases
from 2.5 years to five years by the addition of the new count (assuming sentences are set
consecutively). Absent discount limits, the additional count doubles the prosecutor's
negotiating leverage. If the discount is fixed at 35%, however, the additional count does not
change the defendant's bargaining incentives. With one count, the best offer the prosecutor
can make is 3.25 years (assuming there is an available lesser charge not carrying the
mandatory term which the prosecutor can offer), which exceeds the defendant's ETS.
Addition of the second count increases the ETS to five years, but the fixed discount limits the
plea offer to 6.5 years, which remains too high to induce a plea. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note
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advantage in securing a guilty plea merely by charging extra counts of
the same offense or additional overlapping offenses.' In a fixed-
discount regime, because overcharging does not increase bargaining
leverage, the prosecutor will be less likely to engage in strategic
charging behavior and more likely to make charging decisions based
on her evaluation of what charges the evidence supports and the type
of sentence she believes to be proportionate to the offense and the
offender.
D Baxter Justice
To many, plea bargaining is unseemly not only because it leads to
objectively bad outcomes but also because it gives justice the odor of a
"Turkish bazaar" cultivating cynicism and disrespect for the law
among criminals and the public alike." There is widespread public
sentiment that plea bargaining is inherently improper, creates
disparities among similarly situated defendants, and, worse yet,
rewards more facile bargainers with pleas that are in fact "bargains. ' 83
What is more, as George Fisher has convincingly detailed, plea
bargaining has transformed virtually every aspect of the system-from
18, at 2345 (noting that absent charge bargaining, increases or reductions in underlying
charges have no effect on the decision to plea because "[t]he limited difference between the
post-trial sentence ... and the post-plea sentence for the same offense cannot induce him to
plead guilty when the case against him is weak").
81. George Fisher's historical account of plea bargaining in Massachusetts provides
solid evidence of this dynamic. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 52. By the 1840s, the incidence
of charge bargaining in liquor prosecutions was relatively high. See id After the state
legislature, in 1852, barred prosecutors from selectively dismissing counts through the device
of entering a "nolle prosequi," charge bargaining virtually disappeared. See id Fisher states
that whereas prior to 1852, approximately 35% of liquor cases were resolved through plea
bargains, between 1853 and 1910, only 4 of 602 liquor cases examined reflected charge
bargaining. See id. While I say "no advantage" rather than "little advantage" because the
ratio of plea sentence to trial sentence remains the same, the length of the trial sentence
determines the magnitude of the absolute reduction, and a higher absolute reduction might
matter. For example, a 35% reduction of a forty-year sentence (fourteen years) is far greater
than the same reduction from a ten year sentence (3.5 years). These differences might well
matter to individual defendants. However, it also remains true that the POC has a greater
impact on absolute value when the potential punishment is higher, so that a mere 10% drop in
POC in the forty-year case is worth four years of ETS, but only one year of ETS when the
anticipated trial sentence is only ten years.
82. See JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S
PERSPECTIVE 76 (1972) (reporting based on interviews with criminal defendants that the plea-
bargaining process reduces respect for the system as a whole); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1,
at 1912 ("The idea of allocating criminal punishment through what looks like a street bazaar
has proved unappealing to most outside observers.").
83. See Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We
Trading Off , 55 STAN. L. REv. 1399, 1401 (2003).
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pretrial detention hearings to defense counsel compensation systems-
into a mechanism to induce defendants, directly or indirectly, to plead
guilty." Some critics have also condemned plea bargaining for its
secretive nature.85 Because the bargaining process takes place out of
the public eye, it effectively replaces "public assessment of evidence
by lay adjudicators with a less transparent resolution by professional
executive-branch law-enforcement officials," depriving the public of
the opportunity to evaluate the facts of individual cases and
defendants' culpability or defenses and depriving victims of a
dignified acknowledgement of the pain they have suffered."
Fixed discounts address these process concerns. Like
supermarket price tags, fixed discounts take the haggling out of the
plea-bargaining process." That is, fixed discounts permit the abolition
of bargaining without abolishing the concessions needed to ensure that
most cases are disposed of through guilty pleas rather than trials.
Abolishing bargaining without abolishing concessions preserves the
resource savings that guilty pleas offer, while removing the aura of
arbitrariness that surrounds the plea-bargaining process. At the same
time, fixed discounts ensure that different defendants do not receive
varying discounts, reducing the possibility of disparate treatment
among similarly culpable defendants.
Fixed discounts also diminish the secretive nature of the
bargaining process. Because the terms of plea bargains are fixed and
not subject to negotiation, the decision to plead guilty or go to trial
turns primarily on the value of contesting the case, which is almost
entirely a function of the strength of the prosecutor's evidence. Fixed
discounts, therefore, decrease the need for secret deals negotiated out
of the public eye. As a result, the factors underlying most guilty plea
decisions would be significantly more transparent.
84. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 162-65; see also Peter A. Whitman, Note, Judicial
Plea Bargaining, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1082, 1089 (1967) (criticizing judicial participation in plea
bargaining because "[t]oleration of a procedure which leads defendants to think of the judge
as just one more official to be 'bought off' is clearly not conducive to respect for the law").
Alternatively, it may be that the hydraulic forces driving the rise of plea bargaining ensured
that "only those institutions and devices that proved compatible with plea bargaining have
survived and flourished." Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea
Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1721, 1722-23 (2005) (book review).
85. Bibas, supra note 44, at 2475 ("[P]lea bargaining is a secret area of law.....
86. Lynch, supra note 83, at 1401.
87. For a discussion of this idea, see Kaplan, supra note 29, at 218-24.
88. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 11, at 2004 ("By
abolishing bargaining but not ... concessions, a jurisdiction could retain control over its
guilty plea rate and preserve its.., level of resources committed to trials.").
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In sum, fixed discounts should encourage more innocent
defendants to contest charges, induce prosecutors to screen cases more
carefully, discourage overcharging, and diminish the perception that
justice is a negotiable commodity often traded away in secret deals. In
so doing, fixed discounts appear to provide solutions to many of the
most trenchant criticisms levied against plea bargaining.
III. THE EASY EVASION OF CONVENTIONAL FIXED-DISCOUNT
PROPOSALS
Fixed discounts are neither new nor entirely untested. The
benefits detailed above have long been apparent to commentators, and
calls for replacing laissez-faire plea bargaining with fixed discounts
have been voiced since at least the early 1970s.89 Some jurisdictions
have adopted fixed discounts as a matter of practice if not formal
policy.9' More significantly, for twenty years, federal sentencing law
has been engaged in a massive experiment with a partial fixed-
discount system.9 Although they contain no express plea-bargaining
provisions, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) adopted a
quasi-fixed-discount system by providing a two- to three-level
reduction of offense level to defendants for "acceptance of
responsibility."9  The reduction for acceptance of responsibility is
89. See, e.g., Note, Restucturing the Plea Baigain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 300-02 (1972)
(providing the structure for a preplea conference).
90. See., e.g., Alschuler, supra note 54, at 1065 (noting the practice among some
judges in Houston, Texas of recognizing unstated "bottoms" for different kinds of cases,
below which judges would refuse to sentence, even if the prosecutor recommended leniency).
In many jurisdictions, in which judges directly bargain with defendants, defendants are clear
about the size of the discount they will receive, even if it varies from case to case. See id at
1087-88. In some courts, judges will advise defendants before trial of the sentence they will
receive both if they are convicted after trial and if they plead guilty prior to trial. See id.
91. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 11, at 2004 (describing
the Guidelines system as an "imperfect" approximation of a fixed-discount system).
92. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E 1.1 (2005). The 1987 version of
section 3E1.l(a) originally provided: "If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition
and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for the offense of conviction, reduce the
offense level by 2 levels." Id § 3E.l.1(a) (1987). This version further stated that the two-
level reduction is neither contingent on a guilty plea, nor does a guilty plea automatically
entitle a defendant to the reduction. Id § 3EL.l(b)-(c). The commentary accompanying
section 3El.1 describes a guilty plea as merely "some evidence" of the defendant's
acceptance of responsibility. Id § 3E 1.1 cmt. 1. These reservations, however, have proved
largely formalistic and are all but ignored in practice. The Guidelines were amended in 1992
to authorize an additional one-level reduction where the defendant's guilty plea occurs
sufficiently early to permit it to avoid trial preparation. See id § 3E1. 1(b) cmt. 2 (2005). As
Nancy King and her coauthors explain, "the credits under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 3E 1.1 were designed both 'as a reward for offenders who plead guilty and also as a
recognition of the reduced culpability of offenders who acknowledged guilt."' See King et
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generally unavailable in practice unless an individual enters a guilty
plea.93 This provision grants an approximate 25-35% discount off the
sentence the defendant would have received in its absence (i.e., after a
trial conviction).9'
There is no indication that the fixed discounts in the Guidelines
have had much of a moderating impact on the practice of plea
bargaining in federal courts." Indeed, the percentage of cases resolved
by guilty pleas has reached all-time highs and the actual number of
criminal cases tried has fallen to record lows." Of course, it is possible
that the guilty-plea rate has increased despite a decrease in plea
bargaining rather than because of it, but this seems unlikely. Not only
would this dynamic be counterintuitive, but also there is no indication
that plea bargaining has diminished. Observers of the federal criminal
system report that the plea-bargaining system is alive and well, despite
the formal adoption of fixed discounts. 7 What happened?
In this Part, I will explore the major problems inherent in most
fixed-discount schemes that make full and effective implementation
al., supra note 1, at 961 n.4 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF
GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM Is ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 29-30 (2004),
http://www.ussc.gov/15-year/15year.htm).
93. The empirical evidence strongly supports the claim that section 3E1.1 has largely
functioned as a reward for pleading guilty. See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation,
and 'Acceptance of Responsibility"' The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section
3E].1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1507, 1539 (1997) (noting
data showing that "eighty-eight percent of those who plead guilty receive a reduction, in
comparison to only twenty percent of those who go to trial"). Some commentators, however,
disagree that section 3E 1.1 mainly functions as a reward for guilty pleas, pointing to data that
suggest that federal judges have made available the acceptance of responsibility reduction to
defendants who went to trial. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea
Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Pei'oa 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284, 1299 (1997) (discussing
data-albeit from an early post-Guidelines period-showing that in some districts judges
granted acceptance of responsibility departures to more than 40% of defendants convicted at
trial).
94. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1290.
95. See Albert W Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 85, 112 (2005) (remarking that guilty pleas have
increased in federal courts since the Guidelines were adopted).
96. Guilty pleas accounted for 87% of all federal convictions prior to the Guidelines
implementation, and now account for 97% of all federal convictions, a figure so astoundingly
high that some have declared "'the virtual elimination of criminal trials in the federal
system."' Id. (quoting Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 271, 277 (2005).
97. Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencer 56
STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1252-53 n.150 (2004) (observing that the Guidelines are the principal
cause of the increase in the federal guilty plea rate from 81% in 1980 to the present rate
exceeding 95%).
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impractical. Flaws inherent in those proposals help explain why the
fixed-discount provisions of the Guidelines have not reduced the
prevalence of plea bargaining." As I discuss below, there are two
primary weaknesses in conventional fixed-discount proposals, both of
which are manifested in the Guidelines. First, conventional fixed
discounts are easily evaded through substitute bargaining mechanisms,
including charge and fact bargaining, and most fixed-discount
proposals provide few effective mechanisms to prevent the parties
from engaging in such alternative bargaining." Second, fixed-discount
proposals in general, and the Guidelines in particular, share a common
flaw: it is practically impossible to provide effective judicial review of
plea bargaining to ensure that it remains confined within fixed-
discount limits. This is true for more or less the same reason that
efforts to impose constraints on prosecutorial discretion generally have
failed. The federal experience with fixed discounts demonstrates that,
without some mechanism to limit evasion, the promised benefits of
fixed discounts will remain illusory.'"
A. Evasion ofFixed Discounts Through Alternative Types of
Bargaining
1. Charge Bargaining
One reason the fixed-discount provision of the Guidelines has
played a minimal role in restraining plea bargains is that the use of
guideline ranges, coupled with the power of prosecutors to make
sentence recommendations, permit variation in the plea discount well
above the two- to three-level decrease nominally available through
section 3El 1.°0 Federal prosecutors can increase plea discounts while
remaining within authorized guideline ranges simply by combining
section 3E 1.1 reductions with recommendations for sentences at the
98. I do not contend that the Guidelines were ever intended to reduce plea bargaining,
only that prosecutors' response to the fixed-plea discount provisions in the Guidelines
illustrates the evasive tactics that can be used to get around formal limitations on bargaining.
99. See Bibas, supra note 44, at 2535-36 (explaining the tendency of black markets to
develop to circumvent formal limits on plea discounts); Klein, supra note 1, at 2040
(discussing the alternatives of charge bargaining, fact bargaining, and cooperation).
100. In this Article, I assume that the acceptance of responsibility provisions are
applied uniformly to defendants who plead guilty and never to defendants who go to trial.
Although this is not entirely accurate, I argue that structural flaws in the fixed-discount
system have a much greater causal impact on the guilty-plea rate than does the inconsistent
application of the provisions. For a more nuanced discussion of section 3E 1.1, see O'Hear,
supa note 93, at 1508-10 (focusing on the origin, status, and future of section 3E1.1).
101. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1290 ("Our research uncovered
unequivocal evidence that bargaining and charging practices undercut the Guidelines.").
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lower end of the guideline ranges.' °2 Doing so produces maximum
potential discounts, averaging around 75% at the upper end of the
guideline scale and even higher discount rates at the lower end.' °3 At
the inception of the Guidelines system, the official policy of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) instructed its attorneys to rely primarily
on these tools to induce guilty pleas.'"
But the variability caused by the range/recommendation features
of the Guidelines pales in comparison to that caused by charge
bargaining, which has posed a persistent problem for plea-bargaining
reform. Jurisdictions that have tried to ban plea bargaining in part or
in whole have seen their efforts fail as sentence bargaining is displaced
by charge bargaining,'" and virtually every commentator who has
advocated for fixed discounts has recognized that limiting or
preventing charge bargaining is a prerequisite."'° A fixed-discount
system predicated on limiting the size of sentencing discounts cannot
work as long as charge bargaining is permitted. After all, a bargain to
charge only one rather than two counts of an offense or a bargain to
charge an offense carrying a lesser penalty often has the same ultimate
102. See id
103. For example, the difference between a defendant with a criminal history category
of II and an offense level of thirty-four, who receives the maximum guideline sentence, and
the same defendant who receives a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and
the minimum guideline sentence, is eighty-nine months (121 months versus 210 months). At
lower offense levels, the discount is even more dramatic-1200% in some cases, and
represents the difference between probation and prison in others. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supa note 92, at 211, sentencing table (1987).
104. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities.- An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 506 (1992) (discussing how the DOJ "Redbook" set forth
these instructions in its hundred-page guideline sentencing handbook for federal prosecutors).
105. In Minnesota, for instance, after that state implemented a sentencing-guideline
system that contained a fixed discount for pleading guilty, the number of cases resolved
through sentence bargains "fell from 60[%] to 26%," while the number of cases resolved
through charge bargains "rose from 21 [%] to 31%." See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93,
at 1287 (citing MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 71 (1984)). Schulhofer & Nagel discuss
similar findings that were reported in Pennsylvania following its adoption of sentencing
guidelines. Seeid at 1288.
106. See, e.g., Gazal-Ayal, supra note 18, at 2340 (stating that "[a]s long as charge
bargaining goes on unrestricted, the efficacy of" a policy that restricts discount size is
undermined); see also Gifford, supa note 26, at 80 (proposing the use of "modest sentence
discounts" to encourage guilty pleas coupled with a ban on charge bargaining, explaining that
"[t]o continue to allow charge reductions and dismissals would enable plea bargaining
participants to circumvent the regulated process of determining sentence concessions").
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impact on the defendant's punishment as an agreement to limit or
reduce a sentence.' 7
The DOJ itself has consistently stated that charge bargaining
should remain limited and that "readily provable serious charges
should not be bargained away."'0 8 Nonetheless, charge bargaining has
proved highly resistant to regulation. Not only is charge bargaining not
banned as a matter of practice in federal prosecutors' offices, it is,
according to two federal prosecutors describing plea bargaining in the
District of Columbia, "at the core of most plea agreements"'
Empirical evidence indicates that charge bargaining is not only
prevalent in the federal system but also has a major impact on plea-
bargained sentences."'
There are two main reasons why federal policies purporting to
discourage charge bargains have proven ineffective. First, although the
DOJ frowns on dropping "readily provable" charges, the line
prosecutor's determination of which charges are "readily provable" and
which are not is difficult to second-guess."' Prosecutors can always
defend decisions to accept guilty pleas to lesser charges based on their
assertion that the higher charge, while colorable, was not "readily
provable.""'2 Second, federal prosecutors have enormous power to
107. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics Of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 505, 519-20 (2001) ("By [increasing the number of charges filed], prosecutors can, even
in discretionary sentencing systems, significantly raise the defendant's maximum sentence,
and often raise the minimum sentence as well. The higher threatened sentence can then be
used as a bargaining chip, an inducement to plead guilty."). Stuntz further comments that
"[r]aising the threatened sentence raises the cost of going to trial just as effectively as raising
the likelihood of conviction." Id. at 531.
108. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 46 (1987).
109. Mary Patrice Brown & Steven E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorina
Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. RE.
1063, 1066-67 (2006). Brown and Bunnell describe charge bargaining as setting forth the
charges to which a defendant agrees to plead guilty and the charges that the government in
exchange agrees not to prosecute. Seeid
110. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 943-44 (2006) (citing Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and
Drug Traffickfng Cimes Involving Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for
Improvement, 37 AM. CrMt. L. REv 41, 53-57 (2000) (discussing a study showing that in
more than half of the cases in which defendants were initially charged with gun offenses that
carry mandatory minimum consecutive sentences, the gun charges were dismissed, indicating
their function as charge-bargaining chips)). An earlier study by Stephen Schulhofer and Ilene
Nagel found that the Guidelines were circumvented because sentences lower than could be
justified under the Guidelines occurred in approximately "20-35% of the cases resolved
through guilty plea." See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1290.
111. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 104, at 507 (describing a prosecutor's broad




determine sentences through their discretion to select charges, and they
use that power to induce defendants to plead guilty."3 Notwithstanding
the United States Federal Sentencing Commission's (Commission)
effort to reduce the impact of charging decisions, the selection of
charges makes a major difference with respect to the defendant's
sentence after trial.'1
In theory, "real offense sentencing" could limit prosecutorial
power over sentences through charge selection. As the Commission
noted, a "pure" system of "real offense" sentencing would "base
sentences upon the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged
regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted."'
Real offense sentencing would render charge bargaining obsolete
because specific charging decisions would have no impact on ultimate
sentences. Such a system, however, appears to be far too complex to
implement as a practical matter. After exploring such a system, the
Commission expressly declined to adopt one because it found the
project hopelessly complicated and cumbersome."' The Commission
instead opted for a "charge offense" system, supplemented by several
real offense sentencing features that it claimed would reduce the
impact of charging formalities."' These features included apportioning
punishment based on real offense conduct, such as the offender's role
in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the amount of drugs sold or
money stolen."'
These modest constraints have done little to contain prosecutors'
almost absolute power to control sentencing outcomes through
charging decisions (and hence almost unchecked ability to control the
size of sentence discounts through charge bargaining). However, even
where the real offense conduct provisions of the Guidelines could
113. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Guidelines 81 CAL. L.
REv. 1471, 1507-08 (1993).
114. See id 1506-12 (describing how a "prosecutor's choice of charge dictates the
narrow sentencing range from which the judge could select a sentence" with dramatically
different outcomes depending on charge selection).
115. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL, supra note 92, at 5 (1987). The
Commission contrasts such sentencing with "charge offense" sentencing, which is based
"upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense with which the defendant was
charged and of which he was convicted". Seeid
116. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Res4 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1988) (discussing the
Commission's reasoning).
117. See id (describing federal charge offense system as a "compromise" that "looks
to the offense chargedto secure the 'base offense level' and "then modifies that level in light
of several 'real' aggravating or mitigating factors").
118. See id
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impose bargaining constraints, prosecutors have found ways to evade
them."19
2. Fact, Guidelines Factor, and Cooperation Bargaining
Where the Guidelines' use of real offense conduct limits the
impact of charge bargaining on actual sentences, federal prosecutors
can shift the emphasis of bargaining to the facts relevant for
sentencing. It is not clear how widespread fact bargaining actually
is,' 2° and, as a formal matter, DOJ policy prohibits "fact bargaining."' 2 '
Nonetheless, sentencing stipulations regarding the facts that are
"readily provable" appear to play a major role in the plea-bargaining
process.12 Indeed, "most federal plea agreements" include sentencing
stipulations regarding such issues as the amount of loss, the number of
victims, or other factual issues that impact the Guidelines sentence.'
2 3
Although sentencing judges (and probation officers responsible for
preparing presentence reports for them) are not bound by the factual
stipulations in plea agreements, judges usually accept the stipulated
facts as a practical matter. The assumption that judges would
routinely undertake an independent and thorough evaluation of the
"real" facts of cases has proved mistaken.2 2 As one commentator
stated, "[t]hat judges would actually learn about all of a defendant's
'relevant conduct' was simply a matter of faith-faith that was
probably misplaced notwithstanding the efforts of probation officers to
serve judges in this regard."'26
119. See Brown & Bunnell, supra note 109, at 1067 (describing the Guidelines as
based on "real offense conduct, not the number or, for the most part, the nature of the
charges").
120. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1292 (concluding that fact bargaining
does not appear to be as "prevalent" as in earlier time periods).
121. See Brown & Bunnel, supra note 109, at 1069-70 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-7.530 (2003)).
122. Seeid.at 1068.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1300 ("Many judges think of
fact-finding in the sentencing hearing as a time-consuming nuisance ... [and] prefer to rely
on the parties to settle the facts before sentencing.").
125. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1300.
126. Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 2055, 2066 (2006). Judicial oversight of guilty pleas can be further limited through use
of so called "(C) pleas." See Brown & Bunnell, supra note 109, at 1070-72. A plea
negotiated pursuant to Rule 1 l(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is further
insulated from judicial review because such plea agreements may specify specific sentences
or sentencing ranges, may stipulate that certain provisions of the guidelines or sentencing
factors do or do not apply, and may bind judges who accept such pleas to observe those
agreements. See FED. R. CRIM. P 1 1(c)(1)(C); Brown & Bunnell, supra note 109, at 1070-72.
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Guidelines-factor bargaining-a cross between charge bargaining
and fact bargaining-is probably even more frequently used to
enhance sentence differentials than pure fact bargaining.2 ' Guidelines-
factor bargaining occurs when the parties reach negotiated agreements
regarding which Guidelines factors will apply-such as the
defendant's "role in the offense" or whether a gun was "brandished."'
28
Negotiated resolution of disputes over Guidelines-factor applications
can have a substantial impact on the defendant's ultimate sentence.
Even where a negotiated agreement regarding the application of the
Guidelines factors does not bind the court, judges rarely decline to
follow the parties' joint recommendation as to application of
Guidelines factors, "even if it is factually dubious."' 29
Cooperation bargaining has also played a major role in federal
plea bargaining.'3 ° The Guidelines permit judges to depart downwardly
from the presumptively applicable guideline range where defendants
provide "substantial assistance" to prosecutors.' Defendants remain
ineligible for sentence reductions for their cooperation unless the
government provides a so-called "5K letter," signifying the
prosecutors' satisfaction with the degree of cooperation provided by
the defendant.'32 In addition, federal law authorizes judges to waive
otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentences upon
recommendation from the prosecutor based on the prosecutor's
representation that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in
the prosecution of another criminal defendant.'33 As a result,
cooperation bargaining permits prosecutors to offer defendants
substantially larger plea discounts than they would otherwise receive,
and the structure of the Guidelines ensures that prosecutors have total
control over whether downward departures are available to cooperating
defendants.'34 Prosecutors use that power to ensure that plea discounts
"(C) Pleas" may require downward departures from the otherwise mandatory guideline
sentence, thereby providing another escape hatch from the fixed-discount system. See Brown
& Bunnell, supm note 109, at 1070-72.
127. Schulhofer & Nagel, supm note 93, at 1292-93.
128. Id
129. Id.
130. See Brown & Bunnell, supra note 109, at 1088 (showing that in the District of
Columbia, approximately 25% of defendants receive downward departures as a result of
cooperation agreements).
131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supranote 92, at § 5KI1..
132. Id.
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Supp. V 2005).
134. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 108-09 (1995)
(noting that the structure of cooperation discounts ensures that "if the government improperly
seeks to prevent (a cooperating defendant] from being 'paid' for his cooperation, sentencing
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of sufficient magnitude are available to induce guilty pleas on desired
terms. 
35
Of course, cooperation bargaining is not in itself a bad thing.
Cooperation bargaining is undoubtedly an essential tool of law
enforcement, especially important in complex investigations of white
collar crime, racketeering, and drug smuggling practices that otherwise
would be difficult or impossible to prosecute. 136  Nonetheless,
cooperation bargaining further weakens the fixed-discount provisions
of the Guidelines.
In sum, the widespread evasion by federal prosecutors of the
discount limitations in the Guidelines results from the wide variety of
charge-, fact-, Guidelines-factor-, and cooperation-bargaining tactics
that can be used to get around conventional fixed-discount systems.
Conventional fixed-discount proposals fail to take into account the
problem of evasion and offer little capacity to monitor or prevent the
use of such evasive tactics.
137
B. Judicial Incapacity To Review Charging Decisions
The primary reason regulation of charge bargaining and other
kinds of alternative bargaining is so difficult stems from the
institutional capacity of courts. It has long been settled that separation
of powers principles prohibit the judiciary from forcing the executive
to prosecute a charge it prefers to ignore, and judicial oversight of
prosecutorial charge discretion is virtually nonexistent.' 38  Largely
because judges are recognized to be poorly situated to conduct
independent evaluations of prosecutorial-charging decisions or the
judges may be unable to show him the leniency he otherwise would have received" (emphasis
added)).
135. Seeidat 72.
136. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:
Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1103-09 (1995) (discussing the
importance of cooperation bargaining to organized crime prosecutions).
137. Arguably, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered the
Guidelines advisory, has modestly weakened the importance of these sentencing stipulations.
But, because federal judges continue to rely on the Guidelines to determine what sentences
are reasonable, there is little evidence that Booker has substantially affected federal fact-
bargaining practices. See Brown & Bunnell, supra note 109, at 1088 (explaining that the
biggest effect of Bookeron plea bargaining was to increase the use of "(C) Pleas"-a device,
ironically, that provides the plea-bargaining parties with more, not less, control over
sentencing outcomes than in the pre-Bookerperiod when "(C) pleas" were more infrequent).
138. See John Gleeson, Sentence Bargaining Under the Guidelines, 8 FED. SENT'G
REP. 314, 314 (1996) (noting that prosecutors can always dismiss charges in response to a
court's rejection of a plea bargain).
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factual bases for those charges."' As one court noted, "[i]n the absence
of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or regulatory
or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the task
of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves to
resolution by the judiciary."' Such evaluations would require access
to sophisticated investigative tools and the use of "resource-intensive
investigative techniques" that neither judges nor probation officers
usually have. 4' For similar reasons, judges are not in a strong position
to police the plea-bargaining process in general and charge bargaining
in particular.' 2 With crowded dockets and little personal or institutional
investment in the resolution of particular cases, judges lack incentives
to probe the recesses of plea agreements. If an agreement is good
enough for the parties, it will almost always be good enough for the
judge.'' As a result, the requirement that judges approve plea bargains
before they take effect imposes little actual constraint on the plea-
bargaining process.
The limited ability of judges to review charging decisions is a
major problem for most fixed-discount systems. Most commentators
advocating fixed discounts have assumed that judges would determine
whether a plea agreement was excessively lenient (or in rarer cases,
whether it was excessively harsh) and reject plea bargains that
139. Alschuler, Tial Judge Role, supr note 54, at 1075 n.59 ("A trial judge is plainly
in no position to evaluate the strength of the government's evidence in a pending case ....");
Brown & Bunnell, supra note 109, at 1068 (explaining that the judge typically relies on the
parties' stipulation of the facts); Gifford, supra note 26, at 87 (noting that courts traditionally
"have regarded the actions of the prosecutor as virtually unreviewable").
140. Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973).
141. See Nancy J. King, Regulatng Settlement What Is Left of the Rule of Law in
the Cnrunal Process?, 56 DEPAUL L. RE. 389, 395-96 (2007) (noting that trial judges would
require information based on "adequately funded investigations" to oversee accuracy of
representations in plea agreements effectively).
142. See Richard S. Frase, Comparative Cuirnal Justice as a Guide to Ametican Law
Refonn: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Came 78
CAL. L. REv. 539, 629 (1990) (stating that prosecutorial discretion makes charge bargaining
"more difficult for judges to control than sentence bargaining").
143. Richman states that this was precisely the finding of a report by the Commission,
which noted that "'resource limitations and a reluctance to reject agreements ... made
judicial rejection of plea agreements that undermined the guidelines relatively rare."' See
Richman, supra note 126, at 2070 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 92, at 84);
see also King, supra note 141, at 396 (stating that the problem with relying on judges to
scrutinize plea agreements is that "judges are under more pressure to facilitate deals than to
scrutinize them"). Of course, there are exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo Castillo,
496 E3d 947, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering jurisdiction to hear appeal in a case where
the sentencing judge declined to impose a sentence within negotiated range).
2008] 1267
TULANE LA W REVIEW
incorporate too great (or too small) a discount.'" But reliance on
judges to perform this task is unrealistic. Difficulties in making such
evaluations arise from, among other things, the problem of developing
a metric to measure whether a sentence is "exceedingly lenient" and
the difficulty of forecasting expected trial sentences at plea hearings.
More fundamentally, judges cannot evaluate how lenient any particular
plea bargain is without knowing what implicit or explicit promises
have been made about the strength of the evidence and which, if any,
charges have been declined.'45 Potential charging decisions can vary
widely, and prosecutors are assumed to have virtually unchecked
authority to select charges within the wide band of available options."'
This is not to say that judges have no role to play in plea-
bargaining reform. More active judicial review of guilty pleas could
have a positive impact on plea bargaining.' 7 Judges, however, are in a
weak position either to assess the extent and impact of charges that
could have been filed but were not, or to challenge the accuracy of
stipulated facts in the plea agreement. Thus, because they can only
assess information presented to them by the parties or gathered by
probation officers, judges simply are not institutionally equipped to
make any ultimate determination regarding whether a plea bargain
represents a large or a small plea discount, even if they cared to.
In the next Part of the Article, I explain how a true fixed-discount
system-one that is much harder to evade and courts could
realistically manage-could be devised and implemented through the
use of plea-based ceilings.
IV How PLEA-BASED CEILINGS SOLVE THE FIxED-DIsCOUNT
PROBLEM
In a standard fixed-discount system, like that incorporated into
the Guidelines, the discount for guilty pleas is supposed to be
144. See, e.g., Gazal-Ayal, supra note 18, at 2335 (proposing that to enforce a ban on
overly lenient plea bargains would require judges to evaluate plea bargains and to determine
just how lenient any particular bargain actually is). However, he admits that this is a difficult
task: "it is hard to determine whe-ther a certain sentence is exceedingly lenient." Id.
145. Seeid at2335-40.
146. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD E WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:
PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION, CASES STATUTES, AND EXECUTVE MATERIALS 167 (2005).
147. See Julian A. Cook, III, Crumbs from the Master Table.- The Supreme Court,
Pro Se Defendants and the Federal Guilty Plea Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1895, 1897
(2006) (arguing that judges should provide more searching reviews of the voluntariness of




invariable.' 8 But the prosecutor's ability to make near-binding
sentencing recommendations and to engage in charge, fact, and
cooperation bargaining render actual discounts potentially much
greater and substantially more variable.' 9 This variability of course
undermines the very purpose of fixed discounts, creating disparity
among similarly situated defendants and destabilizing the incentives of
innocent defendants to contest charges and of prosecutors to screen out
low-probability conviction cases. Because charge and fact bargaining
in particular are tactics deployed largely below judges' "radar screens,"
as long as prosecutors can use these tactics to increase discount size,
there is little hope that a workable fixed-discount regime can be
implemented. Plea-based ceilings, however, offer a solution to this
enforcement problem by limiting prosecutors' ability to offer such
inducements.
A. How They Work
The idea underlying plea-based ceilings is straightforward. Plea-
based ceilings guarantee defendants that they will not receive a
sentence following a trial conviction that is more severe than any plea
offer made to them, adjusted upward by the appropriate fixed discount.
To illustrate how this might function in practice, imagine a defendant
charged with bank robbery. Say that the defendant's criminal history
and the facts of the crime would normally result in a ten-year trial
sentence and that the jurisdiction adopted a fixed discount of 33%.
During bargaining, prosecutors offer the defendant a five-year deal.' °
With ceilings, the defendant could accept the offer or proceed to trial
when, if convicted, he would face a maximum sentence capped by the
plea-based ceiling at 7.5 years-that is, the same five-year sentence he
148. For instance, in the federal system the fixed discount for "acceptance of
responsibility" is approximately 25-35% lower than the trial sentence. See Schulhofer &
Nagel, supra note 93, at 1290.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 101-137.
150. My analysis assumes that the prosecutors' plea-bargaining offers are binding and
will be followed by sentencing judges. That assumption, although usually technically false, is
an accurate characterization of most actual practice. See Alschuler, supra note 46, at 567
("[J]udges usually follow the course of least resistance and simply ratify the prosecutors'
sentencing [recommendations]."); Alschuler, Trial Judge 1 Role, supa note 54, at 1064 (citing
a study of courts in Houston, Texas that shows that in a sample of eighty-two felony guilty-
plea cases, in which prosecutors had offered sentence recommendations, the court imposed
the recommended sentence in eighty cases); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the
Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 443 (1971) ("While the assistant
prosecutor's sentence recommendation is not binding, Philadelphia judges generally adhere to
it.").
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would have received had he accepted the plea offer, adjusted upward to
reflect the absence of the fixed discount.'51 The plea-based ceiling, in
other words, mimics what conventional fixed discounts do (had he
pled guilty, he would have received a 33% discount), except it works
backwards. As a result, in a ceiling system, the defendant would know
exactly what he risked in declining the plea offer, permitting him to
calibrate more carefully his decision of whether to risk trial.
Like fixed discounts in general, plea-based ceilings would
dramatically curtail prosecutors' ability to induce defendants in weak
cases to plead guilty. As noted above, because the prosecutor is bound
by whatever plea offer she makes, it is very hard for her to make an
offer that is sufficiently lenient to induce a defendant in a weak case to
plead guilty.'52 If the prosecutor has a 10% chance of convicting the
defendant on a charge that carries a ten-year term, her offer of six
months might look good in a world without ceilings, but if the six-
month offer creates a nine-month ceiling on the sentence the defendant
could receive upon conviction at trial, then the inducement to plead
guilty disappears. The defendant is markedly better off declining the
plea offer and holding out for a trial. Although the defendant's initial
ETS was one year, the defendant's ceiling-adjusted ETS falls to a mere
0.9 months, or roughly three days, after the plea offer.'53 Rational
defendants should be willing to go to trial under these changed
conditions. As a result, plea-based ceilings eliminate the power of
lenient plea offers to induce guilty pleas in weak cases.
The same is not true, however, in strong cases. Consider a
defendant with an 80% POC. In that case, if the prosecutor offered the
defendant the same five-year deal and the defendant rejected the offer,
the maximum trial sentence would still be 7.5 years, and with an 80%
POC, the defendant would have a substantially higher ETS of six
years. This defendant would be better off (although only marginally)
taking the plea offer than going to trial. A defendant who calculated
the odds of conviction at near-certain (99%), would have an even
stronger incentive to take the plea offer, since his ETS of 7.42 years
exceeds the plea offer by nearly 50%. These discounts might well be
large enough to induce defendants to plead guilty. Where the
151. A 5-year sentence is 66.66% of a 7.5-year sentence, or a 33.33% discount.
152. This is assuming that at least the most egregious systemic pressures to enter
guilty pleas are not operative, including situations where defendants held in pretrial detention
can gain immediate release by pleading guilty in exchange for a sentence of time served. For
a discussion of the myriad ways in which the criminal justice system induces defendants to
plead guilty, see Covey, supra note 39.
153. (6 months)(. 1(POC))(1.33 (ceiling adjustment)).
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probability of conviction is high, experience indicates that defendants
do accept plea bargains, even if the offered concessions are minor.'54
A jurisdiction that implemented a ceiling system would of course
first need to determine an appropriate "plea discount.""'5 This itself
might prove politically difficult.' To achieve a sufficiently high
guilty-plea rate, the discount might have to be set much higher than
33%. As the data presented in Part II shows, the typical differential
may exceed 100%, and discounts fixed below that range might
(indeed, should) generate lower guilty-plea rates and higher trial
rates.'57  Jurisdictions would then face the difficult situation of
responding to increased trial demands or frankly acknowledging the
existence of an embarrassingly high plea discount.
Ideally, a compromise might be struck that reduces the
differential below its current high rate, while making accommodation
for a marginally lower guilty-plea rate.' 8 Because the point at which it
is rational for a defendant to plead guilty is a strict function of the size
of the posttrial penalty, considerations regarding the kinds of cases that
should not settle should govern the size of the discount. If the trial
penalty is fixed at 50% (comparable to a 33% plea discount), then the
154. SeeAlschuler, supm note 54, at 1080 n.71 ("[F]ederal defendants often do agree
to plead guilty in exchange for insubstantial concessions simply because the likelihood of
conviction at trial is so high.").
155. As noted previously, prosecutors have proposed discount rates ranging from as
low as 10% to quite high levels. Judge Easterbrook has suggested that present-value
discounting might necessitate very high discount rates. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at
313 (postulating that defendants with a 75% POC and a present-value discount rate of 10%
would equate a 50-year trial sentence with a present-value sentence of 7.43 years). The
discount necessary to achieve an administratively manageable plea rate might differ fromjurisdiction to jurisdiction. SeeAlschuler, supra note 54, at 1124 (discussing a proposal to set
the standard discount rate in each jurisdiction based on the collective view of judges as to
what level would lead to an "'administratively acceptable' volume of guilty pleas").
156. Public recognition of the existence of any discount for guilty pleas raises
uncomfortable issues about the morality and constitutionality of plea discounts and trial
penalties. Open acknowledgment of the existence of a very large discount, moreover, which
might be necessary in some high-volume jurisdictions to obtain an "acceptable" guilty-plea
rate, might be too embarrassing for policymakers to tolerate. On the other hand, as some
fixed-discount advocates have pointed out, frank recognition of the costs of operating a
system based on guilty pleas might have a salutary effect. At least one commentator has
argued that plea discounts should be fixed in order to enhance certainty regarding the
consequences of pleading guilty and thereby increase the number of guilty pleas. See Tom
Lininger, Beating the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1353, 1416 (2005) (arguing that fixing a
standard discount for guilty pleas will result in more pretrial dispositions and less cross-
examination of accusers).
157. See supm text accompanying notes 1-25.
158. Jurisdictions could accommodate lower guilty-plea rates either by increasing
resources (e.g., trying more cases or devoting more resources to investigation) or by filing
fewer cases and pursuing less serious charges in the cases that are filed.
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only cases in which accepting the plea offer is the rational strategy are
cases in which the defendant will be convicted at least two out of three
times (i.e., POC is 0.667 or greater).'5 9 If the trial penalty were
increased to 100%, then defendants would be better off pleading guilty
rather than going to trial in all cases where the POC was at least 0.50.
' 60
With a 100% trial tax, the 80% POC defendant offered a five-year plea
deal would have a sizeable incentive to take the deal, because his ETS
otherwise is eight years. Ideally, the plea discount should not exceed
the point at which prosecutors can induce guilty pleas in cases in
which it is more likely than not that the defendant will be acquitted at
trial.'6' Precluding guilty pleas in cases where the POC falls below
50% is consistent with prosecutorial guidelines that suggest that
prosecuting such cases is unethical.'62 As noted above, the size of the
plea discount will predictably determine the number and types of cases
resolved through plea bargaining. As such, it will have important
effects on both the mix of cases that go to trial and on prosecutorial
screening decisions.
In addition to setting the discount size, the jurisdiction would also
need to ensure that prosecutors memorialize the plea-bargain terms in
writing and present them in a way that provides defendants with an
adequate opportunity to accept or reject them. The memorialization
requirement is necessary to ensure that judges have a clear record to
calculate the plea-ceiling sentence. Written plea agreements are also
wise because they facilitate enforcement of any disputed terms,
regardless of whether the sentence is imposed immediately on the
basis of the plea bargain or after a trial, a point which federal
policymakers at the DOJ have long recognized.'63 Written plea offers
must include all terms. There can be no "secret deals," and
159. Again, this assumes that the defendant's goal was pure sentence minimization.
160. The 50% mark probably constitutes the floor for cases that can ethically be
prosecuted.
161. This threshold is reached where the discount rate is 50% (i.e., the trial penalty is
100%).
162. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2003) ("[N]o prosecution should be
initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person probably will be
found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.").
163. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
on Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and
Sentencing, to All Federal Prosecutors 5 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/
news.fmdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203chrgmem.pdf (instructing that plea agreements
should be in writing or stated on the record); see also Brown & Bunnell, supra note 109, at
1066 (stating that the use of written plea agreements is standard practice in all cases);
Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 93, at 1295 ("Nearly all offices require that plea agreements
normally be in writing, and most have review procedures of one sort or another.").
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prosecutors cannot make a plea offer available only if the defendant
agrees first to accept it. 6" Defendants must remain free to decline plea
offers until formal acceptance of the plea. Prosecutors should not be
permitted to make the extension of a plea offer contingent on its
acceptance. If prosecutors are able to do so, plea ceilings will not
work. Finally, ceiling jurisdictions would have to ensure that written
plea offers are admissible at sentencing.16
B. Why Ceilings Are Easier To Enforce and Harder To Evade
Although plea-based ceilings promise many of the benefits that
conventional fixed discounts offer, there are important differences.
First, plea-based ceilings would be not only far easier for judges to
monitor and to enforce but also harder for prosecutors to evade
through charge or fact bargaining than conventional fixed discounts.
Second, unlike conventional fixed discounts, plea-based ceilings would
not circumscribe sentencing discretion by limiting the scope of
practical outcomes that can be achieved through plea bargaining. Plea-
based ceilings would preserve the flexibility of prosecutors and, to a
lesser extent, judges to take a wide range of relevant factors into
account in determining the ultimate sentence.' 66
164. This requirement would necessitate vigilant policing. The formal procedures
suggested here would preserve the defendant's ability to decline a plea offer at the plea
hearing. It is easy to imagine, however, that prosecutors might agree to make offers only
when defense counsel promises not to later demand a trial and to enforce those
understandings by refusing to make plea offers to clients represented by lawyers who have
reneged on such promises previously.
165. Some courts have barred defendants from offering evidence of plea offers at trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Verdoorn, 528 E2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976) ("Meaningful dialogue
between the parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party had to assume
the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evidence."). For further discussion of this
case, see Todd W Blanche, Note, When Two Worlds Collide. Examining the Second Circuit
Reasoning in Admitting Evidence of Civil Settlements in Cminal Trials, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
527, 545-56 nn.95-98 (2001). In addition, some states bar the use of statements made by ihe
parties during plea negotiations. See, e.g., Newell H. Blakely, Article IV Relevancy and Its
Limits, 30 Hous. L. REv 281, 448-49 (1993) (discussing Texas's ban on the use of such
statements). These rules are generally crafted to protect defendants from government use of
incriminating concessions, and are usually directed to the use of such statements for
evidentiary purposes during trial, not for sentencing purposes. See id
166. Nonetheless, as with any attempt to regulate plea discounts, legal prohibitions
against punitive-charging practices would be essential. Protections stronger than what current
constitutional law provides must be fashioned to prevent strategic or vindictive postoffer
charging conduct in the event that a favorable plea offer was rejected. For example,
prosecutors cannot be permitted to amend an assault charge to a murder charge in the event
that an initial offer to plead guilty to assault is declined. See supra notes 137-147 and
accompanying text.
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Plea-bargaining reforms that rely on fixed discounts or partial
bans require careful judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial decision making
to be effective.'67 As noted above, however, such scrutiny is not
realistic.'68 Judges are not institutionally suited to evaluate plea
bargains to determine whether any particular plea agreement provides
the defendant with an overlarge discount from the expected trial
sentence. Plea-based ceilings avoid these problems.
Judicial oversight is simple in a plea-based ceiling system
because ceilings focus judicial attention on hard facts. Upon
presentation of a written plea offer at the sentencing hearing, judges
would merely need to ensure that the trial sentence did not exceed the
plea-offer sentence by more than the fixed discount. Because
sentences are capped by the written plea terms offered by prosecutors,
judges would not need to speculate about what charges the prosecutor
might have brought or what facts the prosecutor might have alleged to
determine whether the disparity between the plea-bargained sentence
and the trial sentence was excessive. 9 Instead, the judge would only
need to review the set of charges and the factual allegations underlying
them that the prosecutor would have accepted to dispose of the case,
determine what sentencing exposure that package entailed, and ensure
that the sentence imposed does not exceed that amount by more than
the ceiling permits.'7 ° That type of review falls well within the
traditional scope of judicial competence.
Not only would judges be able to enforce ceilings easily,
prosecutors would have more difficulty evading the plea-based ceilings
because they are keyed off the end product that the prosecutor most
167. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 18, at 2335 (explaining that his proposed "partial ban
system relies on courts to review the bargained-for sentences, requiring them to reject
exceedingly lenient bargains").
168. See supra text accompanying notes 57-72.
169. As one scholar noted in discussing the problems associated with counterfactual
inquiries: "It challenges the imagination of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful and
unknowable state of affairs. He is invited to make an estimate concerning facts that
concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to what might have happened opens the
door wide for conjecture." Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact 9 STAN. L. REv.
60, 67 (1956).
170. For example, a defendant who was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to one
count of a charge carrying a ten-year maximum sentence in exchange for a recommended
three-year term, who declined the offer, who contested guilt at trial, and who was convicted of
that charge at trial could simply introduce evidence of the plea agreement at his sentencing
hearing. Assuming a 50% trial penalty (i.e., a 35% plea discount), the plea ceiling would cap
his posttrial sentencing exposure at 4.5 years. The judge would then impose a sentence of 4.5
years or less, based on a full consideration of the record and any mitigating circumstances
that might call for leniency.
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desires: the plea agreement itself. Prosecutors could not get plea
agreements without first making (or acquiescing to) plea offers. With
plea-based ceilings, prosecutors with weak cases could not induce
defendants to plead guilty by making an excessively large plea offer
because the same lenient plea offer would also protect the defendant
from receiving a substantially harsher penalty after trial.17' Regardless
of whether the prosecutor sought to induce the plea through an
overlarge sentence discount or by dismissing charges carrying overly
large upward-sentencing exposure, barring imposition at trial of any
sentence higher than the plea offer, adjusted upward to reflect the
absence of a plea discount, would enforce the fixed discount. As a
result, charge concessions would provide prosecutors no more
bargaining leverage than sentence concessions.
Obviously, plea-based ceilings would have a dramatic impact on
the kinds of plea offers a prosecutor would be willing to make in the
first instance. In a plea-based ceiling system, the prosecutor could not
make extremely lenient plea offers in order to induce a guilty plea
because this would simultaneously reduce the defendant's incentive to
avoid trial without changing the likelihood of conviction. Because a
lenient offer would not result in a plea agreement, the prosecutor will
be far less likely to make such an offer, unless she believed it
represented a substantively fair outcome.
1. Declinations as a Plea-Bargaining Chip
One of the subtler ways prosecutors induce guilty pleas is by
agreeing to defer or decline charges.'72 To be effective, ceilings must
be responsive not only to charge or sentence reductions from charges
that have been filed but also to charge declinations that occur before
charges are filed, including both express and tacit declinations.
Express declinations represent formal promises by the government not
to bring certain charges.'73 The prosecutor's ability to decline to file
171. That is, unless the process costs of contesting the charge outweigh the costs of
conviction and punishment, which will often be true where minor crimes are concerned. See
FEELEY, supra note 41, at 199-240.
172. See Frase, supra note 142, at 612 ("[D]eclinations are often delayed until shortly
before trial, as part of the plea bargaining process."); Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What
Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1863, 1869 (2005) (describing deferred prosecutions as
"an intermediate option between declination and plea bargaining").
173. Many jurisdictions require prosecutors to make a formal record of negotiated
declinations. For example, Rule 11 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates
that the parties make a record of express declinations. See FED. R. C~aM. P. 1 1(c)(1)(A)-
11(c)(2) (noting that plea agreements may include agreements specifying charges the
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charges poses one of the greatest hurdles to any conventional discount
scheme. Like charge bargains generally, courts have little ability to
determine the substantive merits of declined charges. Some express
declinations are included in plea agreements, notwithstanding that the
prosecutor had a strong case on the declined charge and could have
prosecuted."' Others are included even though the prosecutor lacked a
sufficient evidentiary basis to pursue the charge, merely to assuage an
anxious defendant or to satisfy a defense attorney's need to justify a fee
to her client."5 As a result, it is almost impossible to tell if a
declination represents a substantial or de minimis discount and,
therefore, whether the charges to which the defendant has agreed to
plead guilty represent a large or small discount from the expected trial
sentence.
With ceilings, however, express declinations are easily handled.
If a plea offer includes a promise not to file particular charges, then
any sentence obtained after trial could not exceed in magnitude the
adjusted plea sentence, notwithstanding that the charge or charges on
which the defendant ultimately was convicted at trial might otherwise
have required a higher term. "6 In a ceiling system, judges would need
to ignore any cumulative increase that accompanied a conviction on
any counts that were contemplated for dismissal as part of a plea
offer.
177
government will "not bring" and requiring parties to disclose plea agreements in open court
when the plea is offered).
174. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald E Wright, The Black Box: The Reasons Behind
Prosecutors' Declination Choices 1-7 (July 5, 2006) (unpublished paper prepared for
University of Texas Empirical Law Conference, on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-916061.
175. Marc Miller and Ronald Wright have reported data from the New Orleans
District Attorney's office indicating that the single most stated reason given for declining
charges was that the district attorneys were "prosecuting on other charges" and that the
second most common reason was "evidentiary flaws." Id. at 5. Plea bargains that include
declinations of charges falling into the first category clearly provide a meaningful benefit to
many defendants, whereas those falling into the second may not. See id. at 7-10. Albert
Alschuler has documented various aspects of plea bargaining, including agreements reached
to drop irrelevant charges or counts, motivated by criminal defense lawyers' need to appear
effective to their clients. See Alschuler, Defense Attomeys Role, supra note 11, at 1205-06,
1211.
176. In other words, if a defendant were charged with two counts of an offense, each
carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of five years to be served consecutively, and if the
prosecutor offered to dismiss one count in exchange for a guilty plea to the other, which the
defendant refused, and if the defendant were convicted on both counts, the defendant could
not be sentenced to any term greater than the plea ceiling, notwithstanding the fact that his
sentence might well fall below the mandatory minimum term otherwise required.
177. There is precedent for the exercise of such judicial authority. In California, for
instance, state courts routinely strike prior felony convictions in "three-strikes" cases in order
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Some might object that overriding the prosecutor's charging
strategy in this manner infringes prosecutorial-charging discretion.
But far from trenching upon the prosecutor's charging power,
enforcement of ceilings merely holds prosecutors accountable for their
plea offers. If prosecutors wish to obtain convictions and sentences on
multiple counts, each of which carries a minimum sentence, they may
do so simply by making no plea offer inconsistent with that outcome.
But when prosecutors offer to dismiss counts in exchange for guilty
pleas and when the deal provides the defendant with an opportunity to
receive a sentence below what otherwise would be the mandatory
minimum trial sentence, the prosecutors evidence their true beliefs
about the magnitude of a fair and proportionate sentence. Their plea
offers would directly contradict any later claim that longer sentences
are required. Ceilings would limit prosecutors' bargaining power but
not their fundamental discretion to seek whatever outcome the
evidence, the circumstances of the offense, and the record of the
offender, in their judgment, dictate.
2. Off-the-Record Bargains
Tacit declinations present a harder problem. Prosecutors have
long used deferred filing of guilty pleas for sentencing-so-called
"on-file" charging-pre-plea diversion, and other tactics to induce
defendants to plead guilty or to accept some other sanction without
trial. 8 Whereas courts have the capacity to at least try to regulate
charge dismissals, it is much harder to regulate decisions not to file
charges in the first place. Where no record of the declination exists,
to obviate the otherwise mandatory application of three-strikes sentences. See, e.g., People v.
Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 635, 649 (Cal. 1996). Under California law, a court
hearing a three-strikes case has the authority to strike allegations of prior convictions "in the
interests of justice." See id. The court held that the three-strikes law, imposing substantially
enhanced sentences on repeat offenders, did not preclude the court from striking allegations
of prior convictions, even in the absence of a motion requesting that action by the prosecuting
attorney. Id.; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17 (2003) (recognizing the power of
California trial courts to vacate allegations of prior felony convictions sua sponte). Enforcing
plea ceilings by effectively striking the penal consequences of added counts would be
justified by the same basic considerations ofjustice and proportionality.
178. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 84 (describing the benefits of putting cases on hold).
Where the offense is relatively minor, prosecutors might draft charges but place them in the
defendant's file rather than file them in court, as long as the offender agrees to seek
counseling, make restitution, or simply not to reoffend. Such tools continue to play an




there is little basis to assess its impact on sentence.'79 While such
informal resolution of charges is less common with respect to more
serious offenses, prosecutors continue to make use of the declination
power to increase their bargaining leverage, and conventional fixed-
discount schemes provide no mechanism to prevent them from doing
s .180
In a ceiling system, prosecutors undoubtedly would be tempted to
circumvent fixed discounts by dismissing counts or declining to file
charges with the tacit understanding that such dismissals or
declinations are the quid pro quo for a guilty plea to the remaining
charge(s). There are two ways to minimize such evasive tactics.
First, bargaining transparency could be enhanced. Indeed,
increased transparency is critical to any type of plea-bargaining
reform, whether based on ceilings, caps, or conventional discounts.'8'
As Stephanos Bibas has warned, without heightened transparency of
the criminal justice system, insiders will quickly find ways to subvert
reforms that trench upon their interests.'82 Prosecutors and defense
lawyers should be strongly urged-indeed, required-to reveal all
material terms of plea bargains, express and implied alike, in open
court. As noted above, defendants have a strong interest in ensuring
that the terms of plea bargains are set forth clearly, because the lack of
a clear record of the terms of plea agreements makes it much more
difficult to enforce those agreements in the event of breach by the
government. At the same time, prosecutors, as officers of the court,
have an obligation to refrain from conduct that undermines the stated
purposes of sentencing.
Second, recognizing that ceilings necessarily bar imposition of
any sentence based on post-plea-bargaining, upward-charge revisions
would limit the prosecutor's ability to use tacit declinations as
bargaining leverage. Ceilings would thus prevent prosecutors from
using declinations coupled with threats to file new or amended charges
as a club to induce guilty pleas. Bordenzrwher v Hayes illustrates the
179. See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 174, at 3 (describing declination as "hidden
from all traditional legal review yet fundamental to the operation of American criminal justice
systems").
180. See Bibas, supra note 110, at 946-47 (noting that prosecutors use low-visibility
strategies such as declination and charge bargaining to subvert attempts to regularize plea
bargaining).
181. Seeid.at913-18.
182. See id. at 932 (noting insiders' ability to "find new procedural ways to subvert
even mandatory laws" intended to reform the system).
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unfairness of this tactic.'83 In Bordenkircher, the defendant, a two-time
prior offender, was charged with issuing a forged check for $88.30. "
Although the prosecutor could initially have charged Hayes under the
state's habitual criminal statute, which carried a mandatory life
sentence, the prosecutor instead offered him a chance to plead guilty to
the simple offense and receive a recommended five-year sentence.'85
When he refused, however, the prosecutor made good on his threat and
filed a superseding indictment, charging Hayes as a habitual
criminal.'86 Hayes lost at trial and was sentenced to a mandatory life
term. 7 Although the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and
sentence, commentators almost uniformly have condemned the case as
a classic example of strategic and unfair charging behavior.' By
sanctioning these prosecutorial tactics, the Court's decision in
Bordenkircher significantly weakened defendants' bargaining power.'89
This type of strategic charging seriously threatens any type of fixed-
discount system. An effective fixed-discount regime requires limits
not only on plea discounts as to charges that were filed but also on
upward revisions of charges after plea negotiations fail. Without such
limits on postnegotiation charging, prosecutors can easily evade the
discounts.
183. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
184. Id at 358.
185. Id
186. Id. at 359.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, The End ofBordenkircher: Extending the Logic
of Apprendi to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 835, 848-49 (2006) (criticizing the
Court's acceptance of plea threats). As Scott and Stuntz observed, as long as prosecutors can
penalize a defendant's refusal to plead guilty by seeking substantially harsher penalties,
defendants have little freedom to refuse plea offers: "Hayes might not have accepted that
deal, but every future defendant is likely to do so and do so quickly." Scott & Stuntz, supm
note 1, at 1964.
189. Likewise, in Riggs v Famrman, the defendant was charged with petty theft and
was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to a charge carrying an five-year term. 399 F3d
1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005). After Riggs declined the deal on his counsel's advice, the
prosecutor amended the indictment and charged Riggs as a three-strikes offender under
California's three-strikes law. Id. Riggs was convicted and received a sentence of twenty-five
years to life. Id. In the course of habeas proceedings, Riggs adduced evidence that the
prosecutor's office had a policy of routinely offering defendants like Riggs an opportunity to
plead guilty to a non-three-strikes offense, which, if not promptly accepted, would forever
disappear. Id. at 1188 n.3.
In light of such policies, few defendants will decline plea offers regardless of the
viability of their defenses, knowing the hazards such a decision entails. Indeed, in Riggs,
counsel's recommendation to decline the plea offer was deemed constitutionally ineffective
representation and a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1184.
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The inherent logic of fixed discounts should preclude the use of
tactics like those on display in Bordenkircher. In Bordenkircher, the
Court declined to overturn the prosecutor's obviously punitive decision
to amend the indictment in retaliation for the defendant's refusal to
plead guilty in large part because the prosecutor could have charged
the defendant under the habitual criminal statute to begin with, and
that decision would have been unreviewable.'9 ° True enough. But in
any plea-bargaining regime that recognized fixed discounts, the
prosecutor could not both have charged Hayes as a habitual criminal
and made the five-year plea offer, since such a discount is precisely the
type of overlarge inducement that fixed discounts aim to bar. Because,
in a fixed-discount world, the prosecutor could not have engaged in
that plea-bargaining conduct, it follows that she should not be able to
achieve the same result merely by reversing the order of events. Thus,
fixed discounts in general and plea-based ceilings in particular should
necessarily entail barring the government from threatening to bring
harsher charges if a guilty plea is not forthcoming. A ceiling system
therefore would require legislatures or courts to implement rules
barring post-plea-rejection upward-charge revision, at least where the
upward revisions are predicated on the same factual transaction or
course of conduct underlying the initially filed charge(s).' 91
190. 434 U.S. at 364 ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that
the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion."). Moreover, Mdximo Langer argues that the prosecutor's conduct in
Bordena'rcherwas wrongful because the application of the Habitual Criminal Act to Hayes'
case was disproportionate to his degree of culpability. Mdximo Langer, Rethinking Plea
Bargaining: The Pmctice and Reform of Prosecutotial Adjudication m American Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRM. L. 223, 240-42 (2006). The problem with using such judgments
to regulate plea bargaining is the absence of any available metric to gauge proportionality in
charging other than what is set forth in the statutes and applicable guidelines. The metric the
Court used in Bordenkircher was not grounded in an assessment of the proportionality of
applying the Habitual Criminals Act in Hayes's case, but merely its legality. Because Hayes's
conduct was prosecutable under the Act, the Court concluded that the prosecutor was
perfectly within his rights to charge Hayes with its violation. See Bordenlarcher, 434 U.S. at
364.
191. Such rules would be harder to develop, or to police, when unrelated conduct is the
subject of an implied bargain. For example, when a defendant, charged with robbing bank A,
rejects a plea offer and is subsequently charged with robbing bank B as well, courts might
have a hard time determining whether a new post-offer-rejection charge is a punishment for
rejecting the plea offer or unrelated to the defendant's refusal. The most optimistic view of
the prospects of reform in that situation is that courts might be encouraged to take a close
look at whether the information supporting the new charge was available to the government at
the time the initial plea offer was made. In such a situation, the government might carry the
burden to demonstrate that the new charges were not filed for punitive purposes. See, e~g.,
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974) (disfavoring upward revision of a
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V THE HAPPY CONSEQUENCES OF PLEA-BASED CEILINGS
Adoption of plea-based ceilings would go a long way toward
achieving real reform of plea bargaining. As noted above, ceilings
would force a change of the mix of cases in which defendants opt for
trial and, as a collateral consequence, induce prosecutors to change the
way they screen cases.'92 They would also discourage the use of tactics
that subject defendants to duress or which are plainly strategic or
vindictive, including the use of death threats to induce guilty pleas, a
practice the Supreme Court long ago found to be legally unsettling, if
not demonstrably unconstitutional.9 In addition, ceilings would force
the formal acknowledgement of what already is true in fact: plea-
bargained sentences, not posttrial sentences, are the true sentencing
baseline."4
A. Ending Bargaining Duress and Vindictve Charging
Plea-based ceilings would throw a wrench into some of the most
notorious plea-bargaining tactics. Take exploding plea offers, for
instance. Exploding plea offers--one-time offers that, if not promptly
accepted, are gone forever-are standard tools in most prosecutors'
misdemeanor charge to a felony charge after the defendant requested a jury trial, unless the
prosecutor could establish that a change in the charges was based on some factor other than
the defendant's exercise of his procedural rights). The Supreme Court, however, thus far has
declined to place any similar limits on the prosecutor's pretrial discretion to add or reduce
charges based on the defendant's exercise or waiver of procedural rights. See United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382-84 (1982) (refusing to apply a presumption of vindictiveness to
pretrial dispositions). Alternatively, it might be conceded that such tactics simply cannot be
entirely abolished, but that they at least are available only in the smaller subset of cases in
which multiple, nonfactually related crimes can be charged.
192. See supra notes 150-165 and accompanying text.
193. Compare North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28-39 (1970) (affirming a guilty-
plea conviction as voluntary and intelligent when the defendant pled guilty to a second-
degree murder charge in exchange for the dismissal of a first-degree murder charge carrying
a potential death penalty, notwithstanding the defendant's insistence that he was actually
innocent), with United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968) (holding a statute
unconstitutional because it permitted the imposition of a death sentence only upon the jury's
recommendation, imposing "an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional
right"). But see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (explaining that Jackson
did not rule "that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence are
involuntary pleas" and, thus, invalid).
194. As Alschuler points out, the conceit that the sentence differential awards
defendants who plead guilty with a discount rather than assesses the defendant who goes to
trial and loses with a penalty is premised on the notion that the trial sentence is the "just" or
"appropriate" sentence. See Albert W Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels:
The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1414 n.10 (2003).
Systemic tolerance of "lenient" sentences for the 94% of defendants that plead guilty,
however, belies the notion that the trial sentence represents the baseline. See id. at 1412 n. 1.
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plea-bargaining arsenal.'95 Prosecutors typically make such exploding
offers very early, before they have invested substantial resources in the
case, and these offers force defendants to make critical decisions under
intense pressure and in the absence of full information.'96 Under a
plea-based ceiling system, the coercive effect of exploding offers
would be greatly reduced. Because a plea offer, once made, imposes a
hard ceiling on the ultimate sentence, the prosecutor's one-time offer
never quite explodes. Ceilings thus protect defendants' ability to make
uncoerced decisions about whether to accept a plea offer or go to trial
without the fear that declining the offer will trigger excessively
punitive consequences.
This does not mean that incentives to plead early could not be
utilized. First, prosecutors can always encourage defendants to accept
an early offer by threatening to take it off the table, forcing the
defendant to weigh whether the benefits of trial outweigh the benefits
of the plea discount. Second, ceilings would not preclude the use of
codified incentives that permit prosecutors to increase the size of the
fixed discount to reward early pleas.'97 For instance, the Guidelines
reward defendants who enter early guilty pleas with an additional one-
level reduction.'98 Like the Guidelines, the plea discount could include
an incentive for early pleas that save the government the costs of trial
preparation. If the proper sentence reduction for timely acceptance of
responsibility is approximately one-third of the total sentence
reduction available for pleading guilty, as it is under the Guidelines,
then a ceiling system could incorporate such an incentive simply by
increasing the size of the trial penalty ultimately imposed by an
additional one-third if a defendant rejects an early offer. In other
words, prosecutors would be able to make a later plea offer that is one-
third higher without changing the defendant's ultimate incentive to
plead guilty.'99
Ceilings also should necessarily bring an end to one of the most
corrosive and unseemly practices known to plea bargaining: inducing
guilty pleas by threatening defendants with death sentences if they
195. For a discussion on exploding plea offers, see Covey, supra note 39, at 243.
196. See id.
197. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 92, § 3El .1(b) (providing
an additional one-level discount for timely acceptance of responsibility).
198. Seeid
199. For instance, a defendant who received an early two-year plea offer and who
rejected it might face a trial sentence ceiling of 3.5 years, based on a trial penalty of 75%,
whereas a defendant who received an initial offer of two years just prior to trial might face a
trial sentence of only three years, or a 50% trial penalty.
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contest the charges and are convicted at trial. °" If prosecutors extend
an offer to plead guilty to any death-eligible defendant in a capital case
in exchange for a life sentence or less, ceilings should bar the
prosecutor from pursuing a death sentence if the case goes to trial. The
difference between life and death defies reduction into any
conventional discounting scheme, and the basic structure of ceilings is
inconsistent with a penalty scheme that threatens only those who
exercise their trial rights with the death penalty. Such a reform,
moreover, is more consistent with the basic principles that guide post-
Furman capital jurisprudence."' As the Supreme Court has stated,
capital punishment must be reserved for the worst of the worst.'
Where prosecutors are willing to permit a defendant to plead guilty
and receive a life sentence or less, by definition, the prosecutors
themselves signal that the case does not involve the worst kind of
defendant. The defendant's decision to exercise his constitutional
rights cannot be relevant to any rational determination of whether the
defendant's crimes merit the ultimate punishment.'°
200. There is ample evidence that prosecutors use the threat of capital punishment to
induce defendants to plead guilty. Sloan v. Estelle, 710 E2d 229, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1983)
(observing that the prosecutor threatened to seek the death penalty if the defendant refused
the plea bargain); Scott W Howe, The Value ofPlea Bargaimng, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 599, 623
(2005) ("The Court's decisions contemplate ... that many who deserve the death penalty will
not receive that sanction, precisely because they will plea bargain to avoid it."); David
McCord, Lightning St1l Stnkes: Evidence from the Popular Press that Death Sentencing
Continues To Be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary More than Three Decades Afler Furman, 71
BROOK. L. REv. 797, 862 n.202 (2005) (reporting the finding from a study examining the
distribution of defendants in death-penalty cases that the decision to spare a defendant is
usually the result of a plea bargain); see WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF
DEATH 145 (2006) (citing a Georgia attorney estimating that "75 percent of the defendants
who have been executed since 1976 could have avoided the death sentence by accepting a
plea offer"). But see Ilyana Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea
Bargaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York 1995 Reinstatement of Capital
Pun'shment 8 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 116, 116 (2006) (concluding, based on a study of New
York cases, that "the death penalty leads defendants to accept plea bargains with harsher
terms, but does not increase defendants' overall propensity to plead guilty").
201. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (holding that an arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment).
202. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (holding that, to be constitutional,
a death-penalty scheme "must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder").
203. Given that the decision to contest charges at trial has little relevance to a
determination of whether any particular defendant is the "worst of the worst" using capital
sentences as leverage to induce guilty pleas injects enormous disparity in death-penalty
outcomes. See McCord, supra note 200, at 820 (condemning "[tihe Court's refusal to oversee
prosecutorial decision-making" as "a heavy blow to robust death sentence ratios because
significantly more defendants are shielded from death sentences by prosecutorial decisions
than by sentencer decisions").
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Because plea-based ceilings would effectively bar prosecutors
from making plea offers in any case where they wish to seek a death
sentence or to keep that option open, the threat of capital punishment
would lose its value as leverage in securing guilty pleas in serious
cases, perhaps undermining one of its principal uses. But as the
Supreme Court implied in United States v Jackson, guilty pleas
induced by penalty schemes that impose capital punishment only on
those who refuse to plead guilty raise fundamental due process
concerns.2'4 The reasoning behind the Court's conclusion in Jackson
has never been extended to the practice of permitting defendants to
escape capital punishment by pleading guilty, but it should be."'
Failure to put an end to this practice is one of the many shameful
aspects of the Court's generally embarrassing plea-bargaining
jurisprudence. Ceilings would require prosecutors to separate the
decision to plea bargain from the decision to pursue capital
punishment, improving the accuracy of the death penalty by ensuring
that the determination of which persons are most deserving of the
death penalty is not a function of which defendants assert their right to
trial.
B. Recognizing Plea-Bargained Sentences as the True Sentencing
Baseline
The reform proposed here would have one other significant
consequence: it would change sentencing baselines from trial
sentences to plea-bargained sentences. Plea-bargained sentences
reflect society's (or at least prosecutors' and judges') estimate of the
appropriate punishment in standard cases. Plea-based ceilings
formalize this tacit assumption by treating bargain sentences as the
legal baseline while preserving the government's ability to seek higher
sentences where circumstances warrant."°6 Because most criminal
204. 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (holding that the Federal Kidnapping Act, which
permitted a possible death penalty upon conviction at trial but precluded a death sentence
after a guilty plea, imposed an unconstitutional burden on a defendant's assertion of the
constitutional right to jury trial).
205. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1970) (upholding the
conviction of a defendant who pled guilty to avoid a death sentence, even though the statutory
provisions, providing a death sentence only for those who are convicted at trial, were later
found unconstitutional); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (upholding the
guilty plea of a defendant who claimed to be innocent and only pled guilty to avoid the death
penalty).
206. Conceptually, this change is similar to that predicted by critics of plea bargaining,
who urge total abolition. As Albert Alschuler has argued, if plea bargaining were abolished
altogether and all cases went to trial, by definition there no longer would be a distinction
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convictions are obtained through pleas rather than trials, most
sentences are plea-bargained sentences."7 Nonetheless, we continue to
operate under the fiction that the "just" sentence is the much harsher
and rarely imposed trial sentence. In a world without plea bargains,
every defendant would receive the same baseline sentence, and that
sentence undoubtedly would approximate the sentence now awarded to
defendants who plead guilty. If for no other reason, limits on prison
capacities would preclude the alternative.
A system of plea-based ceilings triggers a similar result by
linking posttrial sentences to plea-bargained sentences. If the statutory
sentencing range for a particular offense directs a judge to impose a
ten-year sentence, but prosecutors routinely plead out those cases for
two-year terms, it is far fairer, and more honest, to recognize the two-
year sentence as the baseline penalty for that offense. Certainly, such
recognition is consistent with the goal of reducing disparity in
sentencing, which underlies most sentencing-guidelines systems.
This change of focus would likely instigate far-reaching changes
in the way that prosecutors think about the plea-bargaining process.
Unlike some other reform proposals, ceilings would not directly limit
or constrain the prosecutor's discretion to offer negotiated dispositions
that reflect what they understand or believe to be a fair punishment for
the defendant's crime."8 Prosecutors would be free to craft plea offers
regardless of whether the offer represents a large or small discount
from the expected trial sentence. The only thing prosecutors could not
do in a ceiling system is seek, after a trial conviction, a substantially
harsher disposition than was offered pretrial. Ceilings would prevent
prosecutors from abusing discretion when it is used to "buy" or
"barter" for guilty pleas with large plea discounts and, thus, bring an
end to the tawdriest aspects of the plea-bargaining transaction.
However, ceilings would still allow prosecutors to craft appropriate
dispositions that accord with their moral convictions.
between the sentence a typical defendant would receive after pleading guilty and the sentence
such a defendant would receive after conviction at trial. SeeAlschuler, supra note 6, at 52.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
208. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2127 (1998) (noting that prosecutors typically "are not seeking
simply to maximize the amount of jail time that can be extracted from their adversaries" but
rather "undertake to determine .. . whether the evidence truly demonstrates guilt, and if so,
what sentence is appropriate").
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VI. COMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Implementation of a plea-based ceiling system would face several
types of objections. First, just as judges vehemently objected to the
limitations on their discretion imposed by the Guidelines, they
undoubtedly would object to plea-based ceilings."9  But-to be
cavalier-so what? Judges' objections did not prevent Congress from
implementing the Guidelines, and they should not prevent reform-
minded legislators from adopting ceilings either."'
A more substantive objection might be not that ceilings would
not be well-received by judges, but that plea ceilings would limit
judicial sentencing discretion to an excessive extent. One of the main
critiques of the Guidelines was that, by limiting judges' power to
sentence outside the guideline ranges, the Guidelines transferred too
much power to prosecutors over sentencing outcomes. "' Although
plea-based ceilings appear to heighten that effect, this is largely
illusory. Prosecutors already have the power to determine sentence
through charge, sentence, and cooperation bargaining, and as noted
above, judges have little power and even less incentive to reject those
deals."2 Even when the prosecutors' bargains do not formally bind
judges-as where prosecutors simply agree to make a sentencing
recommendation-judges, in practice, virtually always follow those
recommendations. "' Moreover, rigid sentencing guidelines already
limit judicial sentencing discretion. ' Where guidelines require judges
to impose sentences within a narrow range and where most
permissible guideline adjustments require factual findings or
prosecutorial consent, as do downward departures for substantial
assistance, judicial sentencing discretion appears to play a quite minor
role. Plea-based ceilings will not upset the current distribution of
authority over sentencing.
209. If judges didn't like their prescribed discretion under the mandatory guideline
regime, they would like a plea-ceiling system even less. For documentation of judges'
complaints, see Kate Stith & Jos& A. Cabranes, Judging Under the FedeMl Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1255-56 (quoting judges complaining that guidelines
reduce their role to that of "notary public" or "accountant").
210. Seeid
211. See Standen, supr note 113, at 1475 (stating that the Guidelines have given more
control to the prosecutor).
212. See supm text accompanying notes 138-147.
213. SeeAlschuler, supa note 54, at 1059, 1065 (noting the rarity ofjudicial deviation
from a prosecutor's sentence recommendation and that "judges almost automatically ratify
prosecutorial charge reductions and sentence recommendations").
214. SeeStith & Cabranes, supranote 209, at 1255-56.
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An observer familiar with the Court's recent cases expanding
judicial discretion might fashion a somewhat different objection. In
BlakelV' 5 and Booker,"6 the Supreme Court held that sentencing-
guideline schemes that empower judges to impose heightened
punishment on defendants based on facts not found by the fact finder
beyond a reasonable doubt violate defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights. Do the principles underlying those cases create any possible
constitutional obstacles for a system of plea-based ceilings?
To the extent that Booker increases sentencing uncertainty, it
marginally undermines the viability of conventional fixed discounts."7
This is because the mathematical precision of the prediction that fixed
discounts will induce defendants in low POC cases to decline plea
offers is diminished when anticipated trial sentences are
unpredictable." ' Because the ETS reflects the product of two variable
inputs (the POC and the ATS), an increase in the uncertainty of either
value makes it correspondingly harder to calculate ETS. To the extent
that Booker makes sentencing predictions harder, it decreases the
efficacy of any fixed-discount system predicated on making
predictions about trial sentences. Because ceilings are keyed to plea
offers rather than predictions about trial sentences, however, unlike
conventional fixed discounts, the expansion of judicial sentencing
discretion brought about by Blakely and Booker would not affect plea
ceilings.
Indeed, although conventional fixed-discount schemes are harder
to implement after Blakely and Booker, the legal grounding for a
ceiling system would be bolstered. In a world in which mandatory
guidelines require courts to impose sentences within narrowly fixed
ranges, as in the pre-Booker federal system, ceilings could create a
potential conflict; if the ceiling sentence fell below the guideline
minimum, a downward departure would be required in order to give
the ceiling effect. In the post-Booker world, however, deviation from
the narrow guideline range is no longer presumptively unlawful.
Indeed, respecting the ceiling is entirely consistent with the purposes
of the Sentencing Reform Act."9
215. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
216. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 228 (2005).
217. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judcia Participation iM Plea Negotiations: A
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMp. L. 199, 207 (2006) (noting that after Booker, both "the
trial sentence and the plea discount are more difficult to estimate").
218. See id.
219. For a discussion on the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, see U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, supm note 92, at 2-13.
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A third and very different objection might be that the rigorous
enforcement of fixed discounts is hard to square with cooperation
bargaining. After all, it is the large discounts that prosecutors dangle
before defendants that induce them to enter into probably distasteful
and sometimes very dangerous cooperation agreements. 2" There are a
variety of methods, however, that could be used to accommodate
cooperation bargaining in a ceiling system. One might, for example,
permit or require judges to waive an otherwise applicable ceiling when
a cooperation agreement was part of an initial plea offer and when the
prosecutor adduced evidence at the sentencing hearing that the
defendant had breached the agreement. In such instances, the
sentencing court would impose sentence on the full slate of counts
proved at trial. There might be a concern that such an arrangement
would require advance specification of the presumptive punishment
the defendant would receive as a result of his agreement in the event
that he upholds his side of the bargain. Federal cooperation practice is
structured precisely to avoid specifying the cooperator's discount
because of the damaging use to which such information could be put
in impeaching the cooperating witness.' The answer to that problem,
however, is to permit cooperation agreements that leave the plea
sentence unspecified and that allow judges to depart without
limitation, as they may under current federal law, in response to a 5K
letter at the plea hearing. 2 Careful safeguards, however, would have to
be erected to ensure that cooperation bargaining does not become the
Trojan Horse that undermines ceilings.2
As the above discussion demonstrates, plea-based ceilings are
imaginable. They are possible to implement and pose few structural
incompatibilities with the criminal justice system as it now exists. But
is there any practical hope that this--or any-plea-bargaining reform
might actually be implemented?
Calls to reform plea bargaining have echoed throughout the halls
of academia for decades, with little discernible impact. Some reform
220. See Richman, supra note 134, at 72 (noting that defendants who "snitch" "often
face economic or physical retaliation and social ostracism" but that cooperation can bring a
much larger sentence discount than an ordinary guilty plea).
221. See id. at 73 (explaining that, in a typical cooperation agreement, "the extent of
[the sentencing] break will often be unknown until sentencing, which typically will not occur
until after he has rendered his assistance to the government").
222. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supa note 92, § 5K1. 1.
223. Safeguards might include limiting the number of cases in which cooperation
bargains would be permitted or mandating that prosecutors adduce affirmative evidence that
defendants receiving cooperation discounts actually provided useful information or evidence.
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proposals, such as abolition of plea bargaining,, have foundered
because of a widespread belief that no matter how great the benefits of
abolition, they cannot justify the costs. 24 indeed, most observers of the
criminal justice system cannot begin to conceive of abolition given a
criminal justice infrastructure built upon the assumption of a 90% or
higher guilty-plea rate. There also is reason to doubt that abolition,
even if possible, would improve outcomes. At least some scholarly
analysis indicates that the existence of plea bargaining improves the
accuracy of outcomes.22 But virtually no one contends that plea
bargaining as it is now practiced cannot be improved, and the recurrent
calls for fixed-plea discounts underscore the belief of many
knowledgeable observers that placing firm limits on plea discounts to
ameliorate plea bargaining's most detrimental effects is a good idea.
Implementing reform, however, requires legislatures to unravel
the Gordian knots they have tied in the criminal justice system, knots
that appear motivated by and certainly have the effect of maximizing
prosecutorial plea-bargaining leverage. Legislators have shown
remarkably little inclination to restrict prosecutorial bargaining
power.226 The proliferation of sentences carrying mandatory minimum
sentences, the inflation in sentence severity, the starvation of criminal
defense services for the poor, and a host of other phenomena all have
contributed to the elevation of plea bargaining to the king's seat in the
criminal justice system.
Plea-bargaining reform will never be successful, no matter how
beneficent the expected effects, unless politicians perceive political
gain in reform. Fixed-discount systems, including ceilings, should in
theory be saleable to the public if lawmakers are willing to do the
selling. After all, fixed discounts prevent prosecutors from allowing
defendants to escape serious criminal charges with relatively light
punishments, addressing precisely that aspect of plea bargaining that
the public most typically condemns.2 7 The political winds, however,
continue to blow in the wrong direction.28 DNA-triggered exonera-
224. See, e.g., Gazal-Ayzal, supra note 18, at 2299 ("[A] total ban on plea bargaining
is hardly feasible in the overloaded American criminal justice system.").
225. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supm note 1, at 1913-17 (arguing that resource savings
resulting from plea bargaining permit more complex, accuracy-enhancing trial procedures
and ultimately improve the sorting function of criminal process).
226. See Richman, supam note 126, at 2073.
227. See Howe, supra note 200, at 599 ("The public tends to believe that bargaining
treats defendants too leniently.").
228. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidtist Statutes as Arational Punishmen4 43 BUFF.
L. REv. 689, 689 (1995) (noting that the "voting population shows no interest in enforcing"
limits on state punishment); Lynch, supra note 208, at 2137 (noting "political tendency in the
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tions of innocent defendants might eventually have some impact on
changing the public mood, but countervailing fears about criminal
activity in an age of terrorism may well drown out more mundane
evidence of the criminal justice system's failings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Plea-bargaining reform is possible. As I have argued here, plea-
based ceilings provide one mechanism to monitor and control plea
discounts. The benefits accompanying plea-based ceilings would be
substantial: innocent defendants would be more likely to contest their
cases; prosecutors would be discouraged from overcharging cases and
induced to screen cases more thoroughly; and some of the most
egregious bargaining tactics, including coercing defendants to plead
guilty in order to avoid the death penalty, would be rendered obsolete.
Although judges might initially chafe at the limitation imposed on
their sentencing discretion, the benefits predicted from ceilings should
become apparent to them, not the least of which is shifting the
emphasis of the criminal justice system away from the relentless task
of inducing guilty pleas. Judges, no less than any other participants in
our plea-saturated system, should appreciate the importance of that
goal.
United States over the past quarter century" is characterized by competition among
politicians to enact "ever more numerous, more severe, and more expansive criminal laws, in
an effort to appear tough on crime").
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